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REHABILITATING CHARGE BARGAINING
BY NANCY AMOURY COMBS*
Nobody likes plea bargaining. Scholars worldwide have excoriated the practice,
calling it coercive and unjust, among other pejorative adjectives. Despite its
unpopularity, plea bargaining constitutes a central component of the American
criminal justice system, and the United States has exported the practice to a host of
countries worldwide. Indeed, plea bargaining has even appeared at international
criminal tribunals, created to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity—the
gravest crimes known to humankind. Although all forms of plea bargaining are
unpopular, commentators reserve their harshest criticism for charge bargaining
because charge bargaining is said to distort the factual basis of the defendant’s
ultimate conviction. Commentators apply this criticism to charge bargaining
whether it is used to obtain guilty pleas for domestic crimes or international crimes.
This Article shows, however, that the criticisms leveled at domestic charge
bargaining have been inappropriately transplanted wholesale to the international
context. Through a comprehensive empirical analysis of international criminal
indictments and a series of in-depth interviews with international prosecutors, this
Article shows that international prosecutors routinely charge their defendants with
only a subset of their criminal acts. That is, this Article’s empirical analysis reveals
that international criminal convictions obtained without charge bargaining suffer
from the primary flaw afflicting convictions that are obtained as a result of charge
bargaining—factual distortion—yet they gain none of the advantages that charge
bargaining can provide. This insight necessarily alters our normative assessment of
charge bargaining, so this Article develops a new normative framework by which to
evaluate charge bargaining. Specifically, this Article shows that the desirability of
charge bargaining in international criminal prosecutions has nothing to do with the
contestations surrounding its practice domestically and almost everything to do with
one of the most sharply contested normative controversies in all of international
criminal law—the controversy surrounding the appropriate breadth of criminal
charging.

* Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law, Director Human Security Law Center, William
& Mary Law School. I presented this Article at the American Society for International Law
mid-year meeting, the ICC Scholars’ Forum, and the 2019 William & Mary Law School
Scholarship Slam and received valuable feedback. This Article has benefited from the
insightful comments of Jeff Bellin, Jay Butler, Evan Criddle, Caroline Davidson, Yvonne
Dutton, Adam Gershowitz, Barbora Hola, Dov Jacobs, Eric Kades, Matthew Kane, Patrick
Keenan, Linda Malone, Howard Morrison, Joseph Powderly, Leila Nadya Sadat, Elies van
Sliedregt, Milena Sterio, and Jennifer Trahan. I am also grateful to Dorothy Canevari, Melanie
Dostis, Darja Meskin, Yasmine Palmer, Heather Pearson, and Sean Tenaglia for excellent
research assistance. Any errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobody likes plea bargaining. Scholars from around the world have excoriated
the practice, calling it coercive, unjust, and a host of other pejorative adjectives.
Despite its unpopularity, however, plea bargaining has constituted a central
component of the American criminal justice system for nearly a century. Born as a
means of avoiding increasingly complicated and time-consuming criminal procedure
rules, plea bargaining has become an entrenched feature of American criminal
justice. About 90% of American criminal convictions are obtained through guilty
pleas,1 virtually all of which are obtained through plea bargaining.2 Moreover, in
recent decades, the United States has exported its reliance on plea bargaining to other
countries where the practice was previously unknown.3 Countries as legally

1. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1016 (2000).
2. See Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea Bargaining,
ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/pleabargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/ [https://perma.cc/HCV3-4B2R].
3. Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled
Criminal Justice Systems?, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 356 (2010); Jenia
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dissimilar as Germany,4 Colombia,5 and Poland6 now employ a variety of incentives
to encourage their criminal defendants to waive their rights to trial. Indeed, plea
bargaining is so attractive a means of expediting prosecutions that it has even
appeared at international criminal tribunals, created to prosecute genocide and crimes
against humanity—the gravest crimes known to humankind.7
Prosecutors practice plea bargaining in a variety of ways, and although all of its
manifestations are unpopular, commentators reserve their harshest criticism for one
particular form of plea bargaining: charge bargaining.8 Charge bargaining occurs
when prosecutors withdraw well-founded charges or agree not to bring well-founded
charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea to a reduced set of charges.9
Critics accuse charge bargaining of being both factually distortive and coercive.
Charge bargaining is factually distortive, it is said, because “the offense of conviction

Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining and International Criminal Justice, 48 U. PAC. L. REV.
219, 219 (2017); see also FAIR TRIALS, THE DISAPPEARING TRIAL: TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO TRIAL WAIVER SYSTEMS 40–43, 53–54, 57 (2017); James L. Bischoff,
Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in Latin America, 9 TEX. HISP. L.J. & POL’Y 27,
46–47 (2003); James P. Carey, Reflection on Criminal Justice in Chile, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L
L. REV. 271, 274–75 (2005); Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea
Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 39–44 (2002); Toby S. Goldbach,
Benjamin Brake & Peter Katzenstein, The Movement of U.S. Criminal and Administrative
Law: Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 141, 161
(2013); Roza Pati, The ICC and the Case of Sudan’s Omar al Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a
Valid Option?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 284–87 (2009); Stephen C. Thaman,
Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases, 11
ELEC. J. COMP. L., 21–27, 31–34, 38 (2007); Michael Vitiello, Bargained-for-Justice: Lessons
From the Italians?, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 247, 247 (2017); Vladimir Hrle, Disclosure Issues in
Plea Bargaining, EUR. CRIM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 21, 2018), http://ecba.org/extdocserv
/conferences/oslo2018/PleaBargainingHrle.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2CE-MFGG]; Damian
Tokarczyk, Plea Bargaining Under the Polish Criminal Procedure, EUR. CRIM. BAR ASS’N
(2018), http://ecba.org/extdocserv/conferences/oslo2018/PleaBargainingTokarczyk.pdf [https
://perma.cc/QZU8-66LB]. See generally Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in
Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004).
4. See Golan Luzon, Judicial Conflict Resolution in Plea Bargaining as the Golden
Mean Between the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 597, 601–03 (2019).
5. See Laura Burens, Plea Bargaining in International Tribunals, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 322, 332 (2013).
6. See Monika Roclawska & Adam Bulat, Towards an American Model of Criminal
Process: The Reform of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, 7 BALTIC J.L. & POL. 1, 8
(2014).
7. See generally NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2007).
8. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Defining the Limits of Crime Control and Due Process,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 227, 231–32 (1985) (reviewing HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1982)); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 111–12 (2002).
9. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1195 (6th ed. 2017).
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does not match either the charges the state filed or the reality of the offender’s
behavior.”10 And charge bargaining is coercive, according to commentators, because
it encourages prosecutors to over-charge defendants—by charging them with crimes
that prosecutors do not expect to be able to prove—so as to pressure them into
pleading guilty to crimes the defendant actually committed.11 It is for these reasons
that charge bargaining is considered the most distasteful form of a highly distasteful
practice.12
Indeed, commentators criticize charge bargaining whether it is used to obtain
guilty pleas for domestic crimes or international crimes. However, whereas charge
bargaining is justifiably criticized in the domestic context, this Article shows that it
should be viewed entirely differently—and far more favorably—when it is employed
by international criminal courts. This Article maintains that the criticisms leveled at
domestic charge bargaining have been inappropriately transplanted wholesale to the
international context. Specifically, criticisms of domestic charge bargaining
presuppose certain principles and practices that simply do not exist when
international crimes are prosecuted at international tribunals. Indeed, this Article
demonstrates that even when they are not engaged in charge bargaining, international
prosecutors already employ many of the same practices that characterize domestic
charge bargaining, and they consequently generate many of the same disadvantages
that accompany domestic charge bargaining. Yet because those practices constitute
the norm of international criminal charging, prosecutors accept those disadvantages

10. Wright et al., supra note 8, at 33.
11. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254–55 (2008); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal
Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find
Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 621 (1990); LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 9, at 851; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 50, 85–90 (1968); see also Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring
Effect Suggests that Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1667, 1703–04 (2013).
12. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. At the same time, charge bargaining
may also be the most entrenched and persistent form of plea bargaining. Recent decades have
seen numerous reform efforts aiming to eliminate plea bargaining in various criminal justice
systems. These efforts have generally failed, but even those that were marginally successful
did not substantially reduce charge bargaining. For instance, Alaska was home to arguably the
most comprehensive effort to eliminate plea bargaining when, in 1975, the state’s Attorney
General prohibited his prosecutors from employing the practice. Michael L. Rubinstein &
Teresa J. White, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 367 (1979).
Four years into the ban, sentence bargaining had been virtually eliminated, but charge
bargaining had only been reduced. See id. at 369–71. Moreover, by 1985, widespread and
explicit charge bargaining had returned to most of the state. Teresa White Carns & John A.
Kruse, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310, 317 (1992); see
also Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney’s
Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) (banning sentence bargaining but not charge bargaining);
Raymond I. Parnas & Riley J. Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L.
BULL. 101, 109–10 (1978) (observing that while the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of California prohibited sentence bargaining, charge bargaining may have continued).
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without question and without gaining any of the advantages that charge bargaining
would produce.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. The first is analytical and descriptive. The
second is empirical, and the final two are normative. Part I begins by recounting the
primary criticisms leveled at domestic charge bargaining, and it shows that those
same criticisms have been deployed against charge bargaining in the international
context. Recent commentators have excoriated international charge bargaining for
producing dishonest results in just the same way that their predecessors criticized
domestic charge bargaining. Part I reveals, then, that charge bargaining is even less
popular at the international tribunals than it is in domestic criminal justice systems,
and it is disliked for all the same reasons.
Part II goes on, however, to show that those criticisms are largely misplaced when
they are leveled at international charge bargaining. Specifically, Part II presents an
empirical analysis of international criminal indictments and details a series of indepth interviews that I conducted with international prosecutors. This body of
evidence demonstrates that international prosecutors routinely charge their
defendants with only a subset of their criminal behavior. Convictions at international
courts, therefore, like convictions by domestic criminal justice systems employing
charge bargaining, are factually distortive in that they frequently understate their
defendants’ criminal conduct. Part II reveals, then, that international criminal
convictions obtained without charge bargaining suffer from the primary flaw
afflicting convictions that are obtained as a result of charge bargaining—factual
distortion—yet they gain none of the advantages that charge bargaining can provide.
Part II, thus, shows that that most-criticized aspect of that most-criticized criminal
procedure mechanism in fact stands as the norm of international criminal justice.
Specifically, it shows that the predominant criticisms leveled at domestic charge
bargaining have no salience in the international context. This insight necessarily
alters our normative assessment of charge bargaining, so Part III develops a new
normative framework—one that is grounded on the empirical reality of international
prosecutions, not on largely irrelevant domestic practices and principles. To be sure,
the fact that a practice employed in one context cannot be subject to the devastating
criticisms that apply to it in another context does not serve to justify it in the first
context. But Part III suggests that the core transaction of plea bargaining—trading
leniency for efficiency—can be justified in the international criminal context,
particularly at this moment in time, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) has
suffered a series of misfortunes that have sharply highlighted its need to enhance its
performance and efficiency. Part III goes on to show, in particular, that the
desirability of charge bargaining in international criminal prosecutions has almost
nothing to do with the conflicts and contestations surrounding its practice in domestic
criminal justice systems and almost everything to do with one of the most sharply
contested normative controversies in all of international criminal law: the
controversy surrounding the appropriate breadth of international criminal charging.
Some international prosecutors have brought broad-based indictments that
encompass the majority of their defendants’ criminal activity,13 whereas others have

the

13. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19; see also Prosecution Refuses to Cut Down
Haradinaj Indictment, SENSE TRANSITIONAL JUST. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2007),
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targeted a far narrower range of criminal behavior in order to highlight salient issues
and conserve resources for future prosecutions.14 Each practice garners outspoken
fans and critics, who highlight the benefits of their preferred model. Part III, however,
suggests that there is no one-size-fits-all model for international criminal charging;
rather, a host of salient factors—which include financial, political, structural, and
temporal considerations—should influence the prosecutors’ choice of charges in any
given case.
That said, narrow indictments are desirable in many contexts, and to the extent
they are advantageous in particular circumstances, charge bargaining presents a
valuable means of obtaining those advantages in addition to the resource and
efficiency benefits that guilty pleas routinely provide. Part III, then, concludes by
advancing a novel normative vision of charge bargaining that highlights both the core
and the constructive role that it can play in modern international criminal
prosecutions. Desirable or not, employing charge bargaining in the international
context presents challenges unknown to domestic prosecutors, so Part IV elucidates
those challenges and suggests ways of adapting the practice to render it effective in
the unique international setting. Specifically, Part IV details a series of conditions
that must exist for prosecutors to employ charge bargaining efficiently and
effectively in international prosecutions.
I. CHARGE BARGAINING AND ITS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRITICS
In Anglo-American countries, guilty pleas developed in response to increasingly
complex and time-consuming criminal procedures. Guilty pleas were wholly
unnecessary during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries because the
Anglo-American criminal trials of that day were so quick and summary15 that
London’s Central Criminal Court, the Old Bailey, could process between twelve and
twenty felony cases each day.16 Not surprisingly, those quick, summary trials were
also lacking basic fair trial protections, such as legal representation17 and evidentiary
exclusions designed to ensure defendants’ rights.18 As criminal justice systems added

http://archive.sensecentar.org/vijesti.php?aid=10104 [https://perma.cc/H4RJ-5GUE].
14. See infra Sections II.C.2.a, II.C.3.
15. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183, 190 (1997); John H.
Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 445
(1974) [hereinafter Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion]; John H. Langbein,
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262 (1979)
[hereinafter Langbein, Short History].
16. Langbein, Short History, supra note 15, at 262; see also John H. Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 276 (1978).
17. See Feeley, supra note 15, at 188; Langbein, Short History, supra note 15, at 263
(“The most important factor that expedited jury trial was the want of counsel.”); Langbein,
supra note 16, at 282; see also id. at 307–08 (describing the reasons justifying the prohibition
on defense counsel).
18. Langbein, Short History, supra note 15, at 264; see also Langbein, supra note 16, at
300–06 (acknowledging that prejudicial evidence was admitted in Old Bailey proceedings);
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 10 (1978) (“[T]he
exclusionary rules of the law of criminal evidence[] were still primitive and
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these procedural protections, they safeguarded defendants’ rights, but they also
dramatically lengthened criminal trials and increased their costs. The guilty plea,
then, was born in response to these developments as an alternative, more efficient
case disposition method. That is, as trials became more complex and timeconsuming, guilty pleas became an increasingly popular means of avoiding those
trials. In modern times, guilty pleas serve the same function. Guilty pleas are
particularly prevalent in the United States; in fact, they constitute the method by
which approximately 90% of American criminal convictions are obtained.19
Accused criminal defendants are not usually concerned about the length or cost
of their criminal trials, so if prosecutors want defendants to waive their trial rights
and thereby produce cost savings for the government, then prosecutors must provide
those defendants suitable incentives. Plea bargaining, thus, can be roughly defined
as the provision of incentives to a defendant in exchange for his or her guilty plea.
The incentives in question typically consist of sentence reductions, and the
bargaining in question comes in two forms: sentence bargaining and charge
bargaining. Prosecutors who sentence bargain promise to recommend to the court a
reduced sentence or sentencing range, which both parties expect the court to impose,
in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea.20 Prosecutors who charge bargain decline
to charge the defendant with certain crimes, or they dismiss charges already brought
in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea on a reduced set of charges.21
Charge bargaining itself can be practiced in at least two ways. In what some call
“horizontal charge bargaining,” the prosecutor declines to charge certain factually

uncharacteristic.”).
19. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (estimating “that about
90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty”); Fisher, supra note
1, at 910 (noting that in modern American courtrooms, “guilty-plea rates above ninety or even
ninety-five percent are common”); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1993 (1992) (“[E]ighty to ninety percent of defendants currently
plead guilty . . . .”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 19 (observing that, in many large counties,
as few as 2% of felony cases proceed to trial).
20. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1194 (explaining that a prosecutor may “promise
a certain sentence upon a guilty plea” and that the possibility is slight that the trial judge will
not follow his recommendations); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in
Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1165 (1976) (“[J]udges almost
automatically ratify prosecutorial charge reductions and sentence recommendations.”); id. at
1063–64 (noting that five of the six felony judges in Houston, Texas, followed the prosecutor’s
sentence recommendation in almost every case, while the sixth judge followed the
prosecutor’s recommendation in 90% of the cases); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of
Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 68
(“[R]egardless of the articulated standard, courts rarely intervene in plea agreements.”).
21. E.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1195 (explaining that an “on-the-nose” guilty
plea to one charge may be exchanged for the prosecutor’s agreement to drop other charges).
In many cases, the dismissed charges carry mandatory sentences higher than the range of
sentences available for the remaining charges, so the dismissal of the more serious charges
necessarily results in a reduced sentence. See id.; Michael Bohlander, Plea-Bargaining Before
the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD 151, 151 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
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distinct crimes for which there is sufficient evidence.22 Let’s say, for instance, that
the evidence suggests that the defendant burglarized two homes: one on Elm Street
and one on Main Street. When engaged in horizontal charge bargaining, the
prosecutor would decline to charge the defendant with the Elm Street burglary in
exchange for his guilty plea to the Main Street burglary. The second form of charge
bargaining has been termed “vertical charge bargaining,” and it refers to a negotiation
process in which the prosecution initially charges the defendant for all of the crimes
that appear to reflect his criminal activity but then withdraws some of those charges
and replaces them with less serious charges to which the defendant pleads guilty.23
Assume, for instance, that the evidence suggests that the defendant purposefully
killed the victim. Initially, the prosecutor might charge the defendant with intent-tokill murder, but if engaged in vertical charge bargaining, she might reduce the charge
to unintentional manslaughter in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea to that
crime. Both forms of charge bargaining, like sentence bargaining, are designed to
lead to a reduced sentence of imprisonment for the defendant who pleads guilty.
In the United States, once plea bargaining was introduced, it took hold, and it
continues to remain firmly entrenched. The same appears true for the civil law
countries that have more lately embraced negotiated dispositions of criminal cases.24
By contrast, international criminal tribunals have had a more tempestuous
relationship with case negotiations. In particular, when the first modern international
court—the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—was
established, there was little need for guilty pleas and even less interest in procuring
them. At that time, there were few defendants in the dock, and international attention
was focused on arresting and publicly trying vicious mass murderers, not expediting
their proceedings.25 Admittedly, the ICTY’s first defendant, Dražen Erdemović, did

22. Ronald F. Wright, Charging and Plea Bargaining as Forms of Sentencing Discretion,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 247, 250 (Joan Petersilia &
Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Luzon, supra note 4, at 601–03 (“In Germany, informal settlements have
been used regularly for a long time, and a practice similar to plea bargaining has been
introduced into the German criminal procedure.”). Similarly, Italy amended its criminal code
in 1989 to increase efficiency, including by introducing a guilty plea analogue. William T.
Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 437–39 (2004). By 2012, bargaining had “taken root” such that 34%
of all Italian criminal cases involved bargained-for-justice. Vitiello, supra note 3, at 262. And
the Republic of Georgia introduced a form of plea bargaining into its Criminal Procedure Code
in 2003 and saw a rapid increase in its use in 2006 and 2007. Alkon, supra note 3, at 366–67.
25. Indeed, when the ICTY was being created, the United States proposed including a
procedural rule that would have authorized the prosecution to grant defendants full or partial
testimonial immunity in exchange for their cooperation, but the proposal was rejected. As thenICTY President Cassese described it: “The persons appearing before us will be charged with
genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhuman
acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for
crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be.” MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL
SINCE NUREMBERG 67 (1997).
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plead guilty, but he did so without promise of leniency,26 and no plea bargaining took
place at the ICTY or its sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), for several years.27 Eventually, facing pressure from the United
Nations Security Council to complete their caseload, tribunal prosecutors did begin
to practice plea bargaining—both sentence and charge bargaining—so as to expedite
proceedings.28 From 2001 to 2007, the ICTY and ICTR disposed of twenty-three
cases by means of guilty pleas.29 The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor

26. COMBS, supra note 7, at 60–61.
27. Id. at 59–62 (describing early ICTY guilty pleas that were not obtained through plea
bargaining); id. at 92–94 (describing the ICTR’s first guilty plea in which the defendant
claimed that he was orally promised leniency, but the prosecution recommended the harshest
sentence the tribunal could impose).
28. See, e.g., President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Perss. Responsible for
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L. Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, Letter dated 21 May 2004 from the President of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991,
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2004/420, ¶ 52 (May 24, 2004),
https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/com
pletion_strategy_24may2004_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU4U-U8AZ].
29. See Prosecutor v. Rajić, Case No. IT-95-12-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S,
Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Mrđa, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No.
IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 20, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004); Prosecutor v. Dragan
Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Obrenović
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Momir Nikolić Judgment];
Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S,
Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003); Prosecutor
v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002); Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 2001) (involving three
accused who pled guilty); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001); Prosecutor v.
Zelenović, Case No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007); Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-2001-77-T, Sentencing
Judgment (Feb. 23, 2007); Prosecutor v. Serugendo, Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment and
Sentence (June 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-00-60-T, Judgment and
Sentence (Apr. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-IC-T, Judgment and
Sentence (Mar. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing
Judgment (Nov. 16, 2007).
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embraced negotiated settlements even more enthusiastically during their years of
existence, and prosecutors there obtained approximately half of their convictions
through admissions of guilt.30
Although some international defendants admitted guilt without benefiting from a
reduced sentence, most did gain sentencing benefits, either as a result of sentence
bargaining or charge bargaining. At the same time, the nature and intensity of that
bargaining evolved over time. In particular, early ICTY and ICTR defendants
appeared to receive relatively modest sentencing reductions following their guilty
pleas.31 Later, however, when tribunal prosecutors began facing increased pressure
to resolve their cases expeditiously,32 they offered more generous sentencing
concessions—concessions that were designed to (and did) motivate larger numbers
of defendants to plead guilty. Indeed, ICTY prosecutors obtained a spate of guilty
pleas in 2002 and 2003, and most of these were “paid for” by extremely lenient
sentence recommendations, particularly in comparison to previous ICTY cases, even
those involving defendants who pled guilty.33
Prosecutors’ treatment of charges in ICTY and ICTR guilty plea cases followed
a similar trajectory. In particular, although in some early cases prosecutors withdrew
charges when the defendant agreed to plead guilty, these early withdrawals did not
fundamentally alter the scope of the criminal activity to which the accused
admitted.34 However, in later cases—again under pressure to speed proceedings—
prosecutors began withdrawing charges in ways that both eliminated criminal
activity and redefined the nature of that activity. In the ICTR’s Bisengimana case,
for instance, the prosecution concluded a plea agreement in which Bisengimana
admitted to crimes far less serious than those for which he had initially been

30. Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited
Influence of Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 127 (2006) [hereinafter Combs,
Procuring Guilty Pleas].
31. Id. at 71–73.
32. See Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Prosecution of Perss. Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L. Committed in the Territory
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994,
U.N. Doc. A/57/163-S/2002/733, ¶ 13 (July 2, 2002); The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of Justice?: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Int’l Rels., 107th Cong. 20–25 (2002) (statement of Hon. Pierre-Richard Prosper,
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State); Press Release, Judge
Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Reports on the Continued Non-Cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the
Security Council, ICTY Press Release JDH/P.I.S./706-e (Oct. 23, 2002), https://www.icty.org
/en/press/judge-claude-jorda-president-icty-reports-continued-non-cooperation-federalrepublic [https://perma.cc/665E-5XR9] [hereinafter Jorda Oct. 2002 Report].
33. For a detailed description of these guilty pleas and the sentence bargaining that
generated them, see COMBS, supra note 7, at 73–76.
34. In Todorović, for instance, ICTY prosecutors withdrew twenty-six out of the original
twenty-seven counts after Todorović agreed to plead guilty, but they folded all of these facts
into the remaining charge of persecution as a crime against humanity. Id. at 63.
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charged.35 In other cases, prosecutors withdrew charges in ways that did not alter the
factual bases for the convictions but that redefined those facts in ways favorable to
the accused. In particular, prosecutors withdrew genocide charges in several cases in
which genocide almost certainly could have been proven. Bisengimana and
Serugendo36 were two such cases at the ICTR. At the ICTY, prosecutors withdrew
genocide charges against defendants pleading guilty to involvement in the Srebrenica
massacres.37 In the one previous case involving Srebrenica killings, ICTY defendant
Radislav Krstić had been convicted of genocide after trial and sentenced to a fortysix-year prison term.38 By contrast, after ICTY prosecutors withdrew genocide
charges against Momir Nikolić and Dragan Obrenović and permitted them to plead
guilty merely to crimes against humanity for their involvement in the Srebrenica
massacres, prosecutors recommended sentences of between fifteen and twenty years’
imprisonment for each defendant.39 Such sentence recommendations would have
been unthinkably lenient if the defendants had been convicted of genocide.
Despite the well-recognized efficiency gains of plea bargaining, its use declined
dramatically at the ICTY and ICTR after the early 2000s,40 and the ICC obtained its
first (and only) admission of guilt only after the court had been in operation for
approximately fourteen years.41 The reasons for plea bargaining’s popularity decline
are many,42 but arguably one important factor was the sustained criticism that the
practice attracted from victims, commentators, and the tribunals’ judiciary.

35. Most notably, whereas the indictment had charged Bisengimana with actively
planning and executing the raping and killing sprees that were at the center of the indictment,
the plea agreement portrayed him merely as a passive observer. Id. at 101–03.
36. Id. at 106–08.
37. Momir Nikolić Judgment, supra note 29, ¶ 13; Obrenović Judgment, supra note 29,
¶¶ 3, 10.
38. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 727 (Aug. 2, 2001). The
Appeals Chamber subsequently reduced Krstić’s sentence to a term of thirty-five years.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, at 87–88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
39. Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration
of Amended Plea Agreement Between Momir Nikolić and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex
A, Amended Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(a) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7,
2003); Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Joint Motion for Consideration
of Plea Agreement Between Dragan Obrenović and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A,
Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(a) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 20, 2003).
40. ICTR defendant Michel Bagaragaza did plead guilty in 2009, but he did so only after
an ICTR Trial Chamber rejected the agreement Bagaragaza made with the prosecution to
transfer his case to the courts of Norway. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-S,
Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 1–8, 11 (Nov. 17, 2009).
41. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and
Sentence, (Sept. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Al Mahdi Judgment].
42. One contributing factor, for instance, was the proclivity of some Trial Chambers to
sentence outside the range recommended by the prosecution in guilty plea cases. COMBS, supra
note 7, at 76–80; Alex Whiting, Encouraging the Acceptance of Guilty Pleas at the ICC, POSTCONFLICT JUST. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://postconflictjustice.com/encouraging-the-acceptanceof-guilty-pleas-at-the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/FTG2-876J]; see infra Part IV.
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In the United States, plea bargaining simultaneously holds an exalted and debased
status. It is exalted because it stands as a necessary and vitally important component
of the American criminal justice system.43 Even plea bargaining’s harshest critics
acknowledge that the American criminal justice system—as currently constituted—
requires the use of plea bargaining to dispose of its cases within reasonable periods
of time.44 At the same time, plea bargaining is reviled for a host of reasons almost
too lengthy to delineate. Scholars, commentators, and court watchers almost
uniformly decry plea bargaining for being theoretically indefensible,45 for impairing
defendants’ rights,46 for leading to unconscionable results,47 and for undermining
penological goals,48 among many other sins.

43. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after
plea negotiations is . . . an essential part of the [criminal] process . . . .”).
44. Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model
of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471, 474 (1996) (“Given the limited resources available
to the criminal justice system and the high cost of jury trials, the majority of cases must be
resolved without a trial.”); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 15, at
446 (“The system as now practiced depends on the prosecutor’s exclusive authority to grant
concessions in order to induce waivers of the right to jury trial.”); Steven S. Nemerson,
Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 725 (1980) (noting that there “are insufficient
quantities of judicial and other necessary trial resources to provide a trial in more than a small
percentage of cases”); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 55 (1967) (“Among those in the system, it is generally believed that if
the trial model were to become the routine mechanism for settling issues of criminality, the
system would conceivably break down from overuse—there would be too many cases for too
few courts.”); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 408 (1992) (“This system requires that the accused be subjected to
threats of increased punishment for going to trial.”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 191 (1996) (“In the American
system, plea-bargaining seems to be inevitable. If all those who now plead guilty insisted on
a jury trial, the system would collapse under the burden.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at
1200–01.
45. Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 105 (1976)
(“[B]argains are out of place in contexts where persons are to receive what they deserve.”);
LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 71–86 (1977) (considering plea bargaining a
“reversal” of the purported theoretical model of all criminal process).
46. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 20, at 56–57; Langbein, Short History, supra note 15, at
261–62 (arguing that plea bargaining has been allowed to “subvert[] the design of our
Constitution” and eliminate the opportunity to “present defenses and have . . . guilt proved to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). In particular, plea bargaining is said to encourage innocent
defendants to plead guilty. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 60; John Baldwin & Michael
McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 287, 298
(1979); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 509,
510 (1979); Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 2000; U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIM.
JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS 48 (1973).
47. Gifford, supra note 20, at 55–56.
48. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932–34 (1983).

2021]

REHABILITATING CHARGE BARGAINING

815

Plea bargaining’s domestic critics target all forms of the practice but, as noted in
the Introduction, the form that generates the harshest criticism is charge bargaining.49
Some commentators maintain that charge bargaining leads to more arbitrary results50
or is more disadvantageous to defendants than is sentence bargaining.51 However,
the primary and most prominent criticism leveled at charge bargaining is that it
results in inaccurate—indeed dishonest—proceedings.52 Specifically, charge
bargaining is alleged to distort the truthfulness of either the prosecutor’s initial
charges or the defendant’s ultimate conviction. For instance, if the prosecution
charges the defendant with all the crimes that the evidence suggests he committed,
then the prosecutor will have to withdraw some of those otherwise-provable charges
if she wants to employ charge bargaining to induce the defendant to plead guilty. The
defendant’s ultimate conviction after such a charge bargain is inaccurate because it
understates his actual criminal liability. Alternatively, if the prosecutor is committed
to convicting the defendant for the crimes he actually committed, yet still wants to
engage in charge bargaining, then she must overcharge the defendant; that is, she
must charge the defendant with more or more serious crimes than she believes will
likely be provable at trial.53 Doing so, the prosecution hopes, will induce the
defendant to plead guilty to a reduced set of charges, but one that in fact represents
his actual criminal liability. Charge bargaining virtually always leads to one of the
above two scenarios, and it is for this reason that it is accused of producing dishonest
results.
These criticisms are advanced even more stridently in civil law jurisdictions.54
Negotiated justice came much later to civil law jurisdictions, yet in the last few

49. Frase, supra note 8, at 227, 231–32 (identifying charge bargaining as one of the “worst
types” of plea bargaining); Wright et al., supra note 8, at 111–13 (arguing that charge bargains
are less honest and accessible than sentence bargains and generally do more harm); Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409,
1410–12 (2003) (arguing that charge bargains are less transparent than sentence bargains).
50. Alschuler, supra note at 20, at 1144–45 (“Although sentence recommendation
bargaining permits a precise adjustment of the concessions that a guilty-plea defendant will
receive, charge-reduction bargaining must proceed by leaps from one charge to another, and
the size of each leap depends upon how much less serious each ‘reasonably related’ or
otherwise available offense is than the offense that has been charged.”).
51. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 567
(1978) (arguing that charge bargaining provides defendants with less certainty than sentence
bargaining).
52. Alschuler, supra note at 20, at 1141; Frase, supra note 8, at 227, 231–32; Frase, supra
note 11, at 621; Wright et al., supra note 8, at 111–13; HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT 37 (1982).
53. For a discussion of overcharging, see Alschuler, supra note 11, at 85–87; Covey,
supra note 11, at 1254–55; Gifford, supra note 20, at 47–48; Wright et al., supra note 8, at 33,
85; Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704–05 (2014); Miller, supra
note 11, at 1703-4; Wright et al., supra note 8, at 33, 85.
54. Turner, supra note 3, at 229 (“Charge bargains are typically disfavored in civil law
systems [because t]hey are viewed as inconsistent with the rule of mandatory prosecution that
still prevails in many civil law countries, as well as with the court’s duty to establish the truth
of the case.”).
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decades, civil law country after civil law country has begun employing negotiated
dispositions as a means of expediting case resolutions.55 Yet although these
jurisdictions permit analogues to American sentence bargaining, many have
prohibited charge bargaining.56 The German Civil Code, for instance, expressly
authorizes sentence bargaining and just as expressly bans charge bargaining.57
Italy,58 Poland,59 Russia,60 and Colombia61 likewise allow sentence but not charge
bargaining. In these countries, charge bargaining is particularly reviled because it is
considered inconsistent with both the principle of mandatory prosecution that
prevails in many civil law jurisdictions and with a civil law court’s obligation to
establish the truth of the case.62 As Roza Pati put it: “Charge bargaining in continental
Europe is considered a greater legal sin, [because it] compromises the very raison
d'etre of criminal trial to establish the material truth . . . .”63 For this reason, charge
bargaining is viewed as “bruising continental legal sensibilities.”64
Given the criticism leveled at domestic plea bargaining in general and domestic
charge bargaining in particular, it should come as no surprise that international
criminal law’s brief employment of plea bargaining likewise proved controversial.
As in the domestic context, all forms of international plea bargaining have been
subject to considerable criticism,65 including allegations that the bargaining harms

55. See supra note 3.
56. FAIR TRIALS, supra note 3, at 44–49 (maps showing which countries have sentence
bargaining analogues but no charge bargaining); see also Alemu Meheretu, The Proposed Plea
Bargaining in Ethiopia: How it Fares with Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law and
Procedure, 10 MIZAN L. REV. 400, 409–10 (2016) (noting that charge bargains are generally
outlawed in civil law criminal justice systems).
57. Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 91 (2014).
58. Langer, supra note 3, at 50; Pizzi et al., supra note 24, at 438; Vitiello, supra note 3,
at 260–61.
59. Roclawska et al., supra note 6, at 8; Tokarczyk, supra note 3.
60. Meheretu, supra note 56, at 405.
61. Laura Burens, Plea Bargaining in International Tribunals, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 322, 332 & n.128 (2010) (citing Situation in
Colombia, http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/Colombia [https://perma.cc/LY8E5B5A]).
62. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
35, 44 (Fausto Pocar & Linda Carter eds., 2013); Pizzi et al., supra note 24, at 440–42.
63. Pati, supra note 3, at 287 (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. Turner, supra note 3, at 239 (describing criticisms); Kendra Wergin, Note,
Problematic Precedents: The Conflicting Legacies in the Genocide Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 463, 482–83
(2014).
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victims,66 harms defendants,67 corrupts the historical record,68 and undermines the
tribunals’ legitimacy69 and their ability to advance their penological goals.70
However, just as in the domestic context, charge bargaining is the most disfavored
of a set of highly disfavored bargaining practices.
Indeed, the criticisms leveled at international charge bargaining mirror those that
have been deployed against domestic charge bargaining for decades. For one thing,
just as in the domestic context, international charge bargaining is generally
considered more problematic than international sentence bargaining.71 Civil law
commentators launch the complaint just mentioned—that international charge
bargaining, like domestic charge bargaining, conflicts with the civil law duty to
prosecute.72 Moreover, just as in domestic criminal justice systems, scholars,
commentators, and even the judiciary excoriate international charge bargaining
primarily because it undermines truth telling and distorts the historical record of the

66. Burens, supra note 61, at 330; Janine Natalya Clark, Plea Bargaining at the ICTY:
Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 415, 428 (2009); Julian A. Cook, III, Plea
Bargaining at the Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 473, 475 (2005); Stuart Ford, The Complexity
of International Criminal Trials is Necessary, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 198–200
(2015); Refik Hodzic, Living the Legacy of Mass Atrocities, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 113, 128–
29 (2010); Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals,
8 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 1, 15–24, 30–31 (2008); Regina E. Rauxloh, Plea
Bargaining in International Criminal Justice: Can the International Criminal Court Afford to
Avoid Trials?, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. RSCH., no. 2, 2011, at 13–14; Bohlander, supra note 21, at 161–
62.
67. Cook, supra note 66, at 495–501 (arguing that defendants pleading guilty at the
international tribunals often fail to receive adequate representation); Rauxloh, supra note 66,
at 7–10.
68. Clark, supra note 66, at 427–28; Ford, supra note 66, at 198–200.
69. Burens, supra note 61, at 330; Ralph Henham, The Ethics of Plea Bargaining in
International Criminal Trials, 26 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 209, 210, 217 (2005).
70. See Clark, supra note 66, at 430–31 (arguing that plea bargaining hinders
reconciliation and retribution); Caroline L. Davidson, No Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail
and the International Criminal Trial, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010) (arguing that plea
bargaining undercuts retribution); Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual
Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 583–85 (2005) (same);
Turner, supra note 3, at 241 (recounting criticism that plea bargaining undermines the
educative function of the law).
71. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets
Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 687–88 (2010) (“But if one must
bargain, the best plea bargains are sentence bargains, which offer sentence discounts without
distorting the facts or the charges. Charge bargains are much worse, because lowering the
charges often distorts the historical record and lies to the public about what actually
happened.”); Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1070,
1075, 1080–81 (2004) (“As plea-bargaining before international tribunals goes, sentence
bargaining is far less controversial than charge bargaining . . . .”); Rauxloh, supra note 66, at
5 (“One practice of plea bargaining which is most contested for undermining the principles of
justice is charge bargaining.”); Turner, supra note 3, at 229 (“Charge bargains have been more
controversial because of concerns that they may obscure the true facts of the case and the full
extent of the defendant’s culpability.”).
72. See, e.g., Petrig, supra note 66, at 17–18.
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crimes.73 Stephanos Bibas and William Burke-White, for instance, consider charge
bargains particularly “troubling in the international arena because they undercut
restoration and setting the historical record straight.”74 In a similar vein, Jenia Turner
views international charge bargains as “especially problematic” because they will
lead “[t]he public . . . to wonder . . . whether the conviction in fact reflects the full
criminal conduct of the accused and whether it establishes a credible and complete
historical record.”75 Janine Clark likewise maintains that “the ICTY practice of
charge bargaining means that the ‘truth’ that is established is often only an
incomplete truth.”76
These very same concerns appear in several ICTY judgments, where Tribunal
judges heaped their own criticisms on charge bargaining. In Momir Nikolić, the
defendant—a Bosnian Serb who actively participated in the Srebrenica massacres—
pled guilty to crimes against humanity after the prosecution withdrew genocide
charges.77 The ICTY had previously and subsequently found the Srebrenica killings
to constitute a genocide,78 so the withdrawal of genocide charges against Nikolić
appeared to confer on him a substantial benefit. When sentencing Nikolić, the Trial
Chamber comprehensively considered whether plea bargaining “was appropriate”
for international crimes.79 In doing so, the Trial Chamber identified a host of benefits
delivered through guilty pleas and plea bargaining,80 yet it urged “extreme caution”
in cases where charges are withdrawn lest the resulting charges distort the historical
record.81 Specifically, the Trial Chamber warned that:
If the Prosecutor make [sic] a plea agreement such that the totality of an
individuals [sic] criminal conduct is not reflected or the remaining
charges do not sufficiently reflect the gravity of the offences committed
by the accused, questions will inevitably arise as to whether justice is in
fact being done. The public may be left to wonder about the motives for
guilty pleas, whether the conviction in fact reflects the full criminal

73. Burens, supra note 61, at 329; Mirjan Damaška, Negotiated Justice in International
Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1018, 1031–33 (2004); Ford, supra note 66, at 198–
99 (2015); Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 245, 271–72 (2006); Petrig, supra note 66, at 15–16; Scharf, supra note
71, at 1081 (“[P]lea-bargaining that results in the dropping of charges has the effect of editing
out the full factual basis upon which a conviction rests and thus has the potential to distort the
historic record generated by the Tribunal.”).
74. Bibas et al., supra note 71, at 687.
75. Turner, supra note 3, at 245.
76. Clark, supra note 66, at 424.
77. COMBS, supra note 7, at 65.
78. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 727 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Popović et al, Case No. IT-0588-T, Judgment, at Disposition (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010).
79. Momir Nikolić Judgment, supra note 29, ¶ 74.
80. Id. ¶¶ 67–73.
81. Id. ¶ 65.
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conduct of the accused and whether it establishes a credible and complete
historical record.82
The presiding judge in the ICTY’s Deronjić case articulated the same concerns
but even more forcefully.83 These will be discussed in detail in Section II.D, which
highlights the judiciary’s dramatically different treatment of charge bargaining, on
the one hand, and narrow charging policies, on the other.
It is not only the international judiciary and other scholars who have criticized
charge bargaining. I too have hurled harsh words at the practice. In my book, Guilty
Pleas in International Criminal Law, I advanced a restorative justice model of guilty
pleas and plea bargaining. Central to that model was the need for every guilty plea
to present full and complete truth telling.84 Specifically, I argued that guilty pleas
that meet restorative justice requirements—including by providing a comprehensive
accounting of all of the defendants’ criminal activity—have the potential not only to
reduce costs and thereby increase the number of prosecutions that can take place, but
also to advance aims that are more conventionally associated with truth commissions
and reparations schemes, such as forgiveness and reconciliation.85 Because accurate
and complete truth telling was a fundamental component of my restorative-justice
guilty plea system, I strenuously criticized charge bargaining, deeming it to “virtually
always distort[] the factual basis upon which a conviction rests.”86 I went on to
maintain that the inaccurate convictions resulting from charge bargaining
“undermine truth-telling and reconciliation efforts.”87
On the one hand, the criticisms that I and so many others have leveled at charge
bargaining are entirely accurate. When prosecutors withdraw provable charges or
decline ever to bring provable charges in order to obtain a guilty plea, they render
the factual basis for the resulting conviction inaccurate. And when the factual basis
for the resulting conviction is inaccurate, the tribunal fails to achieve some of its
legitimate penological aims. Establishing a historical record is one of international
criminal law’s primary objectives,88 and it is an objective that is unquestionably
undermined by charge bargaining. The tribunals’ deterrent and retributive functions
are also undercut when charge bargaining leads defendants to be punished for only a
subset of their criminal activity. For these reasons, I neither recant my own
previously expressed views on charge bargaining, nor do I contest the criticisms that
others have voiced.
However, the following Part will show that although our critique of charge
bargaining is theoretically compelling, it is also idealistically beside the point

82. Id.
83. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Schomburg, ¶¶ 4–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Deronjić Schomburg Dissent].
84. COMBS, supra note 7, at 141–43.
85. Id. at 136–54.
86. Combs, supra note 3, at 144.
87. Id. at 207.
88. Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating
the Rule of Law, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 77, 83 (2009); Momir Nikolić
Judgment, supra note 29, ¶ 60.
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because it ignores the reality of current international prosecutions. In particular, Part
II will show that many current international criminal prosecutions are characterized
by factual distortions whether or not they employ charge bargaining. That insight, I
argue, should fundamentally alter our normative assessment of charge bargaining.
II. CRITICIZED FOR ALL THE WRONG REASONS: THE CHARGE BARGAINING OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Charge bargaining is problematic, commentators maintain, either because it is
coercive or because it distorts the factual basis of a defendant’s criminal conviction.
Section A makes short work of the “coercion” criticism in the international context
by showing that there is little reason to expect international prosecutors to charge
crimes they do not believe they can prove.
Sections B and C turn to the “distortion” criticism. There, I concede that in
virtually all cases of international charge bargaining—just as in domestic charge
bargaining—the defendant “gets away” with some criminal activity because the
prosecution withdraws or declines to pursue provable charges in exchange for the
defendant’s guilty plea. Thus, guilty pleas obtained through charge bargaining almost
always understate the defendant’s actual criminal conduct.
This criticism of charge bargaining is therefore accurate, but Sections B, C, and
D will show that the criticism has little force when it comes to international criminal
convictions because a large proportion of international criminal convictions—
following trial—also understate the defendant’s criminal liability such that he “gets
away” with some criminal conduct. Section B explains how and why so many
international criminal convictions understate their defendants’ actual criminal
conduct. Section C presents my empirical findings that flesh out and expand upon
Section B’s exposition. Finally, Section D compares two very similar international
criminal cases: an ICTY case where, via a charge bargain, the defendant was
convicted of crimes occurring during a one-day attack and an ICC case where, via
narrow charging, the defendant was convicted of crimes occurring during a one-day
attack. These three Sections show that the international criminal justice system
currently incurs most of the costs but generates none of the benefits of charge
bargaining.
A. The Uncoercive Nature of International Criminal Charging
As noted in Part I, domestic prosecutors are routinely accused of coercing
defendants to plead guilty to the crimes they committed by initially overcharging
them. That is, domestic prosecutors are believed to charge defendants with some
crimes that are likely unprovable so as to pressure them into pleading guilty to the
crimes that are provable—or, said differently, the crimes the defendants actually
committed. Such coercive practices are unquestionably undesirable.
However, this valid criticism of domestic charge bargaining is almost certainly
inapplicable in the international context simply because international prosecutors
have no reason ever to overcharge. As Section B will delineate, one of the primary
challenges confronting international prosecutors is that most of their defendants have
committed far more crimes than international tribunals have the resources to
prosecute. Thus, international prosecutors would have no reason to charge crimes
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that they did not consider provable in order to induce a defendant to admit guilt
simply because they could so easily charge the defendant with additional crimes that
they did consider provable.
That said, Part IV will acknowledge the possibility that international prosecutors
practicing charge bargaining may be forced to charge defendants with more provable
crimes than they would like to prosecute, given available resources. But charging a
larger set of provable crimes in order to motivate the defendant to admit guilt to a
smaller subset of those provable crimes is not coercive because prosecutors in fact
believe the defendant to have committed the charged crimes. Said differently, it is
not coercive to charge defendants with the criminality we actually believe them to
have perpetrated even if we may not have the resources to hold them accountable for
all of that criminality. International defendants have no inherent right to benefit from
the resource constraints that bedevil international criminal tribunals. For defendants
to do so, indeed, would be to obtain a windfall—a windfall that, as the following two
Sections show, a large percentage of international defendants do in fact obtain.
B. The Distorted Factual Bases of Most International Criminal Convictions
As noted, charge bargaining almost always distorts the factual basis of a criminal
conviction. As a theoretical matter, that fact renders the practice highly undesirable
in any context. As a practical matter, however, international prosecutions differ from
domestic prosecutions in one particularly relevant way; therefore, our normative
assessment of charge bargaining in the two contexts also should differ. Specifically,
in the domestic context, it is typically both expected and possible to charge and
convict defendants for all of the serious crimes they commit. Such comprehensive
charging is ostensibly required in civil law jurisdictions that feature mandatory
prosecutions for serious crimes.89 Common law jurisdictions, such as the United
States, do not statutorily require prosecutors to charge every chargeable crime,90 yet
it is nonetheless expected even in these jurisdictions that prosecutors will charge all
serious chargeable crimes. Thus, if an American defendant rapes two women, we
want him to be charged and convicted of both rapes. Likewise, if an American
defendant commits armed robbery, we expect him to be charged and convicted of
armed robbery, not unarmed theft. To be sure, for the sake of efficiency, some
American mass murderers are charged with a subset of their criminal activity, but
that typically occurs only when conviction on that subset renders the defendant
eligible for the maximum punishment the jurisdiction permits.91 Thus, when, through

89. See Gwladys Gilliéron, Comparing Plea Bargaining and Abbreviated Trial
Procedures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 703, 707 (Darryl K. Brown,
Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Bettina Weisser eds., 2019).
90. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 20 (2019) (“A prosecutor has broad
discretion in deciding both whether to charge and which charges to file against a defendant . .
. .”).
91. For example, John Allen Muhammad, the “D.C. Sniper,” was convicted of two counts
of capital murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and using a firearm in commission of a deathpenalty eligible homicide under Virginia law. Frank James, Muhammad Convicted as D.C.
Sniper, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2003), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-200311-18-0311180108-story.html [https://perma.cc/G4AS-82L2]. Prosecutors declined to charge
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charge bargaining, American defendants are convicted of only a subset of their
criminal activity, we justifiably condemn charge bargaining for dishonestly
distorting the factual bases of the defendants’ criminal convictions.
However, that foundational principle—that defendants can and should be charged
for all of the crimes they committed—does not exist when it comes to international
criminal prosecutions. To understand why, one must understand certain facts about
international crimes, about the conflicts that become subject to international criminal
prosecutions, and about the international bodies that are created to impose criminal
accountability following those conflicts.
First, international crimes: A core feature of most international crimes is that they
envisage—and in some cases require—a large quantity of criminal behavior. For
instance, the actus reus of crimes against humanity includes the requirement that the
act be part of a large-scale or systematic attack against a civilian population.92
Similarly, the crime of genocide requires proof of an intent to destroy an entire people
in whole or in part.93 Concededly, just because a crime against humanity requires
large-scale criminality does not mean that every defendant who commits a crime
against humanity has himself engaged in large-scale criminality; however, it does
mean that that defendant’s crimes are surrounded by a large number of similarly
serious crimes. And that brings us to the conflicts that become subject to international
criminal prosecutions; specifically, these conflicts typically feature large numbers of
international crimes. As noted, prosecutors could not charge crimes against
humanity, for instance, unless a large number of crimes had occurred. Further, the
international community would not incur the political and economic expense of
creating a tribunal, nor would the ICC open a situation, unless the conflict in question
was sufficiently widespread and serious. And in fact, the conflicts on which
international attention has been focused—in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Kenya
among others—have virtually all featured large-scale atrocities resulting in
thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of victims. Finally, international
criminal prosecutions are expensive,94 and because each prosecution costs so much
and each conflict features so many crimes, the international tribunals have the

additional federal and state crimes when it became clear that prosecution under Virginia law
was likely to result in the imposition of the death penalty. See Andrea F. Siegel, Murder Trial
for Malvo Set to Start in November, BALT. SUN (Jan. 29, 2003, 3:00 AM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/bal-te.md.malvo29jan29-story.html [https
://perma.cc/FW4U-9ASR].
92. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
93. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Rome Statute, supra note 92, at art. 6.
94. Nancy Amoury Combs, From Prosecutorial to Reparatory: A Valuable Post-Conflict
Change of Focus, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 219, 227 (2015) (“By 2013, the ICC, ICTY, ICTR,
SCSL, ECCC, and the STL had spent a whopping $6 billion to prosecute a mere 285
defendants.”).

2021]

REHABILITATING CHARGE BARGAINING

823

resources to prosecute only a tiny proportion of the criminal behavior that occurred
during the relevant conflicts.95
These three facts are well known and uncontested; consequently, it is likewise
well known and uncontested that international criminal tribunals can target for
prosecution only a relatively small number of defendants from a much larger pool of
offenders.96 The ICTY, for instance, indicted 161 offenders97 out of a population of
at least 10,000.98 Yet, even that low prosecution-to-offender ratio proved too costly
for the international community, and subsequent tribunals were permitted to
prosecute an even smaller proportion of offenders. Specifically, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) were given jurisdiction only over those bearing the greatest responsibility
for the crimes that occurred during the conflict.99 As a consequence, the SCSL
prosecuted a grand total of ten defendants100 for the more than two million nonfatal
offenses and tens of thousands of civilian deaths that occurred during Sierra Leone’s
decade-long civil war.101 The ECCC, for its part, will close after prosecuting only

95. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Deconstructing the Epistemic Challenges to Mass
Atrocity Prosecutions, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 280–81 (2018).
96. See Mariana Pena, Criminal Investigations Overseas: Legal and Policy Issues for an
International Prosecutor, 28 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (2013); Margaret M. deGuzman,
Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 265, 267 (2012); Int’l, Impartial & Indep. Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation
& Prosecution of Perss. Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under Int’l L. Committed
in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011, Report of the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic
since March 2011, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/72/764, (Feb. 28, 2018).
97. Key Figures of the Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases [https://perma.cc/CA8D-W7Q4] (Aug. 2019);
Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 342
(2013).
98. COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., POST-WAR JUSTICE AND DURABLE PEACE
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 15 (2012).
99. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, art. 1, ECCC Doc. No. NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004); Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, U.N Doc. S/2002/246, App. II Attachment (Mar. 8, 2002).
100. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment (May 18, 2012). The tenth defendant, Sam Hinga Norman, died
after his trial finished but before judgment. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Aug. 2, 2007)
101. TAMY GUBEREK, DANIEL GUZMÁN, ROMESH SILVA, KRISTEN CIBELLI, JANA ASHER,
SCOTT WEIKART, PATRICK BALL & WENDY M. GROSSMAN, BENETECH HUM. RTS. DATA
ANALYSIS GRP. AND AM. B. ASS’N, TRUTH AND MYTH IN SIERRA LEONE: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT, 1991-2000, 3–5 (2006), https://hrdag.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Benetech-Truth-Myth-Sierra-Leone-1991-2000.pdf [https://perma.
cc/QG9V-ALRC].
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three offenders102 for the four years of Khmer Rouge atrocities that claimed
approximately two million Cambodian lives.103 Finally, the permanent ICC
prosecutes, at most, only a few offenders for each situation it addresses.104 Selectivity
in defendants is thus a well-known and necessary feature of international criminal
justice.
In recent years, however, the three facts delineated above have led not only to
selectivity in defendants, as just described, but also to selectivity in crimes. That is,
resource constraints forced international prosecutors not only to prosecute a small
proportion of international offenders but also to prosecute those offenders for only a
subset of their criminal activity. Indeed, the following Section, containing
comprehensive empirical analyses, shows that a substantial percentage of
international criminal convictions after trial understate the defendants’ criminal
liability and present a distorted factual picture of the defendants’ crimes. That is,
most international criminal convictions—after trial—suffer from the primary
disadvantage of charge bargaining.
C. The Distorted Factual Bases of Most International Criminal Convictions:
Empirical Proof
1. Methodology
This Section presents the results of my empirical analysis of the charging practices
of the ICTY and ICC. I selected the ICTY because it prosecuted more cases than any
other international tribunal, and it is unquestionably considered the most successful
of the ad hoc tribunals.105 I selected the ICC because, as a permanent institution with

102. Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (Jul. 26, 2010);
Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Case 002/01 Judgment
(Aug. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Case
002/02 Judgment (Nov. 16, 2018).
103. Khmer Rouge: Cambodia’s Years of Brutality, BBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10684399 [https://perma.cc/VS6Z-P8CS]. To
be sure, other factors, including the defendants’ advanced ages and Cambodia’s intense
political interference, also worked to reduce the number of defendants prosecuted by the
ECCC. But the court’s restricted jurisdiction ensured that only a small number of defendants
would be prosecuted even if circumstances had been more favorable to prosecutions. See Seeta
Scully, Judging the Successes and Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of
Cambodia, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 300, 323–25 (2011).
104. See Off. of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶ 2(b)
(Sept.
14,
2006),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/d673dd8c-d427-4547-bc692d363e07274b/143708/prosecutorialstrategy20060914_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6HLBPRZ] [hereinafter OTP 2006 Strategic Report]; see also Jacob N. Foster, A Situational
Approach to Prosecutorial Strategy at the International Criminal Court, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L.
439, 442 (2016); Ron Levi, John Hagan & Sara Dezalay, International Courts in Atypical
Political Environments: The Interplay of Prosecutorial Strategy, Evidence, and Court
Authority in International Criminal Law, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 313 (2016).
105. See Kenneth Roth, A Tribunal’s Legal Stumble, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/global/a-tribunals-legal-stumble.html [https:/
/perma.cc/X9V3-E4DB] (labeling the ICTY “the gold standard for international justice”).
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potentially global jurisdiction, it is the world’s preeminent international criminal
body and arguably stands as the future of international criminal justice. As for my
methodology, I examined every ICTY case that went to trial and every ICC case that
either went to trial or that did not because the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm
charges. For purposes of this empirical analysis, I sought to determine for each case
whether prosecutors had withdrawn charges of ostensibly provable crimes, declined
to charge the defendants with ostensibly provable crimes, or otherwise purposefully
understated the defendants’ criminal liability. As should be evident from my phrasing
of the research question, my analysis did not end with a finding that prosecutors had
withdrawn charges. Rather, if I ascertained that prosecutors had withdrawn charges,
I additionally considered whether those charges were likely provable. For instance,
if I learned that prosecutors withdrew charges because witnesses had become
unavailable or for other reasons of evidentiary insufficiency, then I did not conclude
that prosecutors had withdrawn charges of ostensibly provable crimes or otherwise
had understated the defendant’s criminal liability.
To make these determinations for ICTY cases, I looked for charge withdrawals,
crime site withdrawals, and/or decisions not to bring ostensibly provable charges by
(1) comparing early indictments with the operative indictment for trial; (2) reviewing
the procedural history of each case; (3) reviewing every relevant pre-trial document,
including pre-trial briefs, motions to amend indictments and responses thereto, and
pre-trial and status conference transcripts; (4) searching for discussions of the
charges in a variety of secondary sources; and (5) interviewing prosecutors assigned
to the cases when it was unclear whether prosecutors had withdrawn or declined to
bring provable charges or had otherwise understated the defendant’s criminal
liability. In many cases, prosecutors resisted withdrawing charges and did so only
when ordered by Trial Chambers that were seeking to reduce the length and cost of
trials. In these cases, it was easy to conclude that the charge withdrawals stemmed
not from evidentiary concerns but from efficiency concerns.
My methodology for ICC cases was more varied. For each case, I reviewed the
Document Containing Charges, as I had done with ICTY indictments, and I also
reviewed other relevant ICC documents, including Confirmation of Charges
decisions and relevant portions of the judgments. However, ICC prosecutors who
understated their defendants’ criminal liability were more likely to charge narrowly
in the first place than to charge broadly and then withdraw provable charges during
the course of the proceedings. Thus, to ascertain whether ICC charges in fact
understated a defendant’s criminal liability, I had to compare ICC charges with
descriptions of the defendant’s likely criminal liability appearing in the reports of
human rights bodies, nongovernmental organizations, the press, and other secondary
sources. Although these sources provided sufficient information to make a
determination in the cases that went to trial, they were not as informative in the cases
in which charges were not confirmed; thus, in those cases, I could not reach certain
conclusions.
2. Understatement of Criminal Activity at the ICTY
My review of all of ICTY cases that went to trial showed that in 44% of them
prosecutors purposefully understated the defendants’ criminal liability in order to
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expedite proceedings.106 This statistic tells only part of the story, however, because
the data shows a considerable evolution in ICTY prosecutorial charging practices. In
particular, prosecutors understated criminal liability in a much smaller proportion of
early cases than later cases. Specifically, in cases for which trial judgments were
released from the years 1997 to 2007, 29% featured purposeful understatement of
criminal liability. By contrast, in cases in which trial judgments were released from
the years 2008 to 2018, a whopping 69% featured such understatement. Graph 1,
appearing next, shows that the percentage of cases that featured purposeful
understatement of criminal liability trended upward significantly throughout the
ICTY’s lifespan.
Graph: % Cases with Understated Criminal Liability (with trendline)

Similarly, the chart below shows the percentage of cases that featured purposeful
understatement of criminal liability by year and provides details of that
understatement in the footnotes.107

106. Such understatement occurred in at least nineteen out of forty-three ICTY cases that
went to trial.
107. An appendix citing the trial chamber judgments in each of these cases appears at the
end of this article.
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Number
of Trial
Chamber
Judgments
Issued
During This
Year
1

1998

2

1999

1

2000

2

2001

4

2002

2

2003

4

2004
2005

1
5

Names of the Cases
(N= no
understatement;
Y=understatement)
Tadić (N)
Mucić et al. (N)
Furundžija (Y)108
Aleksovski et al. (N)
Kupreškić et al. (N)
Blaškić (N)
Kunarac et al. (N)
Krstić (N)
Kordić & Čerkez (N)
Kvočka et al. (N)
Krnojelac (Y)109
Vasiljević (N)
Naletilić & Martinović
(N)
Stakić (N)
Galić (Y)110
Simić (N)
Brđanin (N)
Strugar (Y)111

Percentage of
Cases This
Year Featuring
Understated
Criminal
Liability
0%
50%
0%
0%
0%
50%

25%
0%
40%

108. In Furundžija, prosecutors withdrew charges alleging Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Convention invoking “the interests of justice, of a fair and expeditious trial and, the judicial
economy of the Trial Chamber.” Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT,
Prosecutor's Response to Defence Motions to Dismiss Count 12 of the Indictment for Failure
Adequately to Plead International Armed Conflict and to Dismiss Counts 12, 13 And 14 for
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March
6, 1998).
109. In Krnojelac, prosecutors withdrew charges alleging Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Convention in order to reduce the “trial time needed.” Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT97-25-PT, Motion to Withdraw Article 2 Counts, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 27, 2000).
110. In Galić, prosecutors sought to add a provable incident, but the Trial Chamber denied
its request because it would delay the proceedings. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 776 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
111. Strugar prosecutors first eliminated charges alleging Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Convention. Prosecutor v. Strugar et al., Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Prosecutor’s Amended
Indictment and Application for Leave to Amend, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 26, 2002); see also Prosecutor v. Strugar et al., Case No. IT-01-42-PT,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Amended Indictment and Application for Leave to Amend (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2003). A year later, the prosecution sought to
dramatically reduce the time period that the indictment covered in order to “expedite the trial”
and “enable the Tribunal to meet its obligations under the completion strategy.” Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42, Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Indictment of 31
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2005.
(Continued)

2006

3

2007

3

2008

3

Blagojević & Jokić (N)
Halilović (N)
Limaj et al. (N)
S. Milošević (Y)112
Krajišnik (N)
Hadžihasanović et al.
(Y)113
Orić (N)
Mrkšić (Y)114
Martić (N)
D. Milošević (Y)115
Haradinaj et al. (N)
Boškoski & Tarčulovski
(N)
Delić (Y)116
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33%

66%

33%

March 2003 and to File a Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 3 (Aug. 27, 2003). The Trial
Chamber granted these amendments. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment,
¶ 488 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005).
112. In compliance with the Trial Chamber’s Rule 73bis order, the Slobodan Milošević
prosecution eliminated numerous crimes and incidents from its Bosnia and Croatia
indictments. See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Public Version of
the Confidential Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Grant Specific Protection Pursuant
to Rule 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 2002); Prosecutor v. Slobodan
Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Scheduling Order Concerning Amending the Croatia and
Bosnia Indictments (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2002); Prosecutor
v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 27, 2004).
113. In Hadžihasanović et al., prosecutors dropped two counts of war crimes and nine
counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention to promote judicial economy. Prosecutor
v. Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Prosecutor’s Amended Indictment Cover
Letter, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 11, 2002); Prosecutor v.
Hadžihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended Indictment, ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 11, 2002).
114. Prosecutors in Mrkšić eliminated Grave Breaches charges in order to “shorten . . . the
trial.” Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1/PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to File
an Amended Indictment, ¶ 8 (August 29, 2002). Later, prosecutors additionally removed the
imprisonment count, reducing the total number of alleged counts to eight. Prosecutor v.
Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1/PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to File a Consolidated
Amended Indictment, ¶ 8 (July 21, 2003).
115. After the Trial Chamber invited the Dragomir Milošević prosecution to reduce the
scope of the case pursuant to Rule 73bis, see Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT98-29/1-PT, Scheduling Order Varying Time-Limits with Regard to the Commencement of
Trial and Request to Prosecution to Reduce the Scope of its Case, ¶ 3 (Nov. 23, 2006), the
Prosecution eliminated eight sniping and eight shelling incidents. Prosecutor v. Dragomir
Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Prosecution's Response to Pre-Trial Chamber's
“Invitation to Prosecution to Reduce the Scope of its Case, ¶ 3 (Dec. 5, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on the Amendment of the Indictment
and Application of Rule 73bis (D) (Dec. 12, 2006).
116. In Delić, the Prosecution was refused leave to add three crime sites because the Trial
Chamber did not want to delay the start of the trial and prolong its course. Prosecutor v. Delić,
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2009

2

2010

1

2011

3

2012

1

2013

3

Šainović (Y)117
Lukić & Lukić (Y)118
Popović (N)
Đorđević (Y)119
Perišić (Y)120
Gotovina et al. (Y)121
Tolimir (N)
Stanišić & Župljanin
(Y)122

100%
0%
100%
0%
67%

Case No. IT-04-83, Decision on the Prosecution’s Submission of Proposed Amended
Indictment and Defense Motion Alleging Defects in Amended Indictment, paras. 23, 74 (June
30, 2006).
117. In Šainović, prosecutors removed an incident involving the murder of six Kosovar
Albanians in Dakovica. Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Amended Joinder
Indictment (Aug. 16, 2005). Additionally, the Trial Chamber prohibited the Prosecution from
leading evidence in relation to the crime sites of Račak, Padalište, and Dubrava Prison.
Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Judgment, ¶ 16 (Feb. 26, 2009).
118. In Lukić & Lukić, the Prosecutor considered adding charges of rape and enslavement
but decided against it because she thought it would lengthen the case and subvert the tribunal’s
Completion Strategy. Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, 7
NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 170, 209 (2009).
119. Đorđević was initially joined to Milutinović, so when Milutinović prosecutors
withdrew charges pursuant to Rule 73bis, they did the same in Đorđević. Prosecutor v.
Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Amend the Third
Amended Joinder Indictment, ¶ 45 (July 7, 2008).
120. In Perišić, the Pre-Trial Chamber invited the Prosecutor to reduce the number of
counts by one-third, which the Prosecution declined. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-0481-PT, Invitation to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment
(Nov. 20, 2006). Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Prosecutor’s Response to
Invitation to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment, ¶ 3
(Dec. 4, 2006). Subsequently, the Chamber ordered the Prosecution to lead no evidence on
“terror” in relation to the Sarajevo counts in order to reduce the scope of the case. Prosecutor
v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Application of Rule 73bis and Amendment of
Indictment, paras. 16-17 (May 15, 2007).
121. In Gotovina et al., the Trial Chamber requested the Prosecutor reduce the scope of the
indictment by one-third to ensure expeditious proceedings. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No.
IT-06-90, Request to the Prosecution Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D) to Reduce the Scope of its
Case, 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2006). The Prosecutor declined this invitation but suggested that it would,
if ordered, reduce the number of municipalities from twenty to fourteen and further reduce the
temporal scope of its case. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90, Prosecution’s
Response to Trial Chamber’s Request Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 1, 8–10 (Jan. 22, 2007).
The Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to reduce the indictment accordingly. Prosecutor v.
Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90, Order Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D) to Reduce the Indictment, 4
(Feb. 21, 2007).
122. Throughout the Stanišić & Župljanin proceedings, the prosecution eliminated large
numbers of crimes and incidents. See Status Conference Transcript at 63–64, Prosecutor v.
Stanisić & Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-PT (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
12, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-04-79-PT, Invitation Pursuant to Rule
73bis (D) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 8, 2008); Prosecutor v. Stanišić,
Case No. IT-04-79-PT, Prosecution’s Response to Trial Chamber’s Invitation Pursuant to Rule

830

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

2014
2015

0
0

2016

2

2017
2018
2019

1
0
0

Stanišić & Simatović
(Y)123
Prlić et al. (N)
N/A
N/A
Šešelj (Y)124
Karadžić (Y)125
Mladić (Y)126
N/A
N/A
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N/A
N/A
100%
100%
N/A
N/A

The next two subsections (1) explore the evolution in charging practices that
occurred over time at the ICTY and (2) delve more deeply into that data to elucidate
the various normative implications that emerge.
a. ICTY Charging Practices Over Time
As just described, my empirical analysis shows that prosecutors rarely reduced or
declined to bring provable charges during the ICTY’s early years, but they did so

73bis (D), with Confidential Annexes, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
20, 2008).
123. The Stanišić & Simatović prosecutors resisted reducing the indictment, claiming that
doing so would create an inaccurate historical record. The Trial Chamber nonetheless ordered
the prosecution to substantially reduce the indictment. Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović,
Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 18, 20–21 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2008).
124. The Šešelj Trial Chamber invited the Prosecution to reduce the scope of the indictment
pursuant to Rule 73bis, which the Prosecution initially declined, arguing that such reductions
would render the case unrepresentative. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT,
Prosecution’s Response to Trial Chamber’s “Request to the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to
Reduce the Scope of the Indictment,” ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept.
12, 2006). When the Trial Chamber insisted, the prosecution eliminated a large number of
counts and crime sites. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Submission
of Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 21, 2006).
125. In Karadžić, at the Trial Chamber’s insistence, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT95-5/18-PT, Order to the Prosecution under Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 5–7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 22, 2009), the Prosecution substantially reduced the scope of its
indictment by, among other things, eliminating more than 50% of the municipalities in which
crimes had initially been charged. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT,
Prosecution Submission Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 10–15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Decision
on the Application of Rule 73 bis ¶¶ 5–6 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8,
2009).
126. In Mladić, pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s Rule 73bis (D) request, prosecutors
reduced the scheduled crimes from 196 to 106, removed two killing sites related to Srebrenica,
removed six sniping incidents, and removed eight shelling incidents. Prosecution v. Mladic,
Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Decision Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 4, 6, 13–14 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2011).
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increasingly and routinely as the years passed. This increase in charge reductions
correlates with other changes in the ICTY’s practices over time. Specifically, at the
ICTY’s outset, prosecutors were unable to obtain custody over defendants who were
at large, so they targeted their early indictments against defendants who were already
in custody in other jurisdictions.127 Bill Schabas cuttingly described this strategy as
ICTY prosecutors settling “for any villain they could get their hands on.”128 Many of
these early villains, unsurprisingly, were low-level offenders whose criminal
behavior involved relatively few victims and crime sites.129 Consequently, because
the earliest ICTY cases involved defendants who committed comparatively few
crimes, and because prosecutors had comparatively few defendants in the dock,
prosecutors possessed the necessary resources to charge those defendants with all or
most of the crimes they believed those defendants to have committed. That is, for
these reasons, early ICTY prosecutors had no need to limit charges or decline to bring
provable charges.
Soon, however, the ICTY began focusing prosecutorial attention on more
culpable senior political and military leaders. Scholars and commentators had
sharply criticized the ICTY’s prosecutions of low-level offenders,130 maintaining that
international tribunals should use their limited resources to prosecute more culpable
senior military and political leaders.131 Moreover, in the early 2000s, the Security
Council became concerned about the costs of international criminal prosecutions,132
so it began pressuring the ICTY and ICTR to formulate a completion strategy to
bring their work to an end.133 In response, the ICTY adopted a multi-pronged

127. Frederiek de Vlaming, Selection of Defendants, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 542,
550–51 (Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2012).
128. William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV 535, 543 (2010).
129. Id. For instance, Anto Furundzija was initially indicted in 1995 for idly standing by
while another soldier in his command interrogated and then raped a Muslim civilian.
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 262–69 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
130. See Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate
Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 353, 359 (2001);
Janine Natalya Clark, International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach, 9
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 99, 111 (2009).
131. See, e.g., Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17
CRIM. L.F. 281, 283 (2006); Nizich, supra note 130, at 359.
132. Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Prosecution of Perss. Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L. Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, Report of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994,
¶ 13 U.N. Doc. A/57/163-S/2002/733 (July 2, 2002).
133. See S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); see also The
U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of
Justice?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Hon.
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approach that included both plea bargaining to resolve cases expeditiously and
abandoning prosecutions of low-level offenders134 in order to focus remaining
prosecutions on senior military and political leaders.135
The ICTY’s change of focus in favor of prosecuting senior offenders required it
to make concomitant changes to its charging practices. Specifically, because highlevel offenders typically commit broad-based crimes that span lengthy time periods
and wide geographical regions, ICTY prosecutors seeking to complete their work
more expeditiously were often forced to limit the charges against these defendants to
a subset of the defendants’ criminal behavior. The need to bring more narrowly
tailored indictments when targeting senior leaders became all the more clear
following the mammoth trial of Slobodan Milošević, the former President of
Yugoslavia. Because Milošević was notoriously believed to be responsible for wide
swaths of death and destruction throughout Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo,136 ICTY
prosecutors understandably sought to charge him with a relatively comprehensive set

Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State)
(“We have and are urging both Tribunals to begin to aggressively focus on the end-game and
conclude their work by 2007–2008 . . . .”); Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia,
Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 30, 2002),
[hereinafter Del Ponte 2002 Address] (referring to “the completion strategy targets and the
deadlines . . . expected of us”).
134. The ICTY began withdrawing the indictments of suspects considered not sufficiently
high-level. See ICTY Bulletin, No. 21, July 27, 1998, at 4; Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugoslavia, Indictment Against Zoran Marinić Withdrawn (Oct. 4, 2002)
(withdrawing indictment on the ground that the suspect was “a low-level indictee” whose
prosecution no longer corresponded to the Prosecutor’s strategy); see also Sean D. Murphy,
Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 74–75 (1999) (describing withdrawn indictments).
135. Del Ponte 2002 Address, supra note 133 (“I have drastically prioritised our
investigative objectives, for both Tribunals, and further focused our efforts on ‘the main
civilian, military and paramilitary leaders’”) (emphasis in original); Rep. of the Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Prosecution of Perss. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L.
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. A/57/379 ¶ 6 (Sept.
4, 2002) (observing the ICTY’s efforts to further “focus[] . . . [its] mission on trying those
crimes which most seriously violate international public order”). Jorda Oct. 2002 Report,
supra note 32 (then-ICTY President Jorda noting that the Security Council “expressly
mandated us to concentrate our work on the trial of the main civilian, military, and paramilitary
leaders, in particular, so as to be able to complete our trial activities by around 2008”). Indeed,
ICTY judges were so concerned with ensuring that indictments targeted only high-level
offenders, they amended the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure to authorize the
judges themselves to determine, before confirming the indictment, whether it “concentrates
on one or more of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” ICTY R.P. & EVID. 28 (2004) [hereinafter ICTY RPE];
see also Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 147–50 (2005); Rachel S. Taylor,
Judges Change the Rules, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (NOV. 9, 2005),
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/judges-change-rules [https://perma.cc/28W8-NK96].
136. See GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 133 (2007).
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of crimes that reflected his criminal conduct throughout the entire region.137
Prosecutors likewise sought to bring all of the charges in one trial.138 Doing so, they
believed, would prove most efficient139 and, even more importantly, would ensure
that all of Milošević’s crimes were in fact prosecuted. As particularly relevant here,
prosecutors feared that if Milošević were initially convicted of just a subset of his
crimes, then the international community might later be unwilling to provide the
resources necessary to prosecute the remainder.140 That is, the Milošević prosecutors
specifically sought to avoid understating Milošević’s criminal liability and distorting
the historical record.141 It is for this reason that they prosecuted him under a massive
sixty-six-count indictment that contained multiple charges of genocide and crimes
against humanity for hundreds of crime sites throughout Bosnia, Croatia, and
Kosovo.142
Certainly, the desire to prosecute Milošević for all of his criminal activity was
admirable, but it resulted in a four-year trial that ended without a verdict when
Milošević died from the medical difficulties that had plagued him throughout the
proceedings.143 Although an in-depth examination of the Milošević trial indicated
that its long length stemmed primarily from the defendant’s poor health and his
insistence on self-representation,144 prosecutors nonetheless were harshly criticized
for charging Milošević with so many crimes in the first place.145 Human Rights
Watch spoke for many when it scolded the prosecution for seeking to “provide a
comprehensive account of an individual’s role in a conflict” when that individual is
“a high-level defendant.”146 Instead, Human Rights Watch advised the prosecution
to narrow similar future cases by focusing on the worst of the charges. It maintained
that “presenting a case representative of the most serious crimes committed should

137. Timothy William Waters, The Trial: IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Milošević, in THE
MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY 53, 62 (Timothy William Waters ed., 2013).
138. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case Nos. Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Case No. IT-01-50PT, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 27, 2001).
139. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE: LESSONS FROM THE SLOBODAN
MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL 51 (2006).
140. Id. at 52.
141. BOAS, supra note 136, at 112; Frédéric Mégret, Joinder, Fairness, and the Goals of
International Criminal Justice, in THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL, AN AUTOPSY 120, 129 (Timothy
William Waters ed., 2013).
142. A mere one count of deportation in Kosovo charged Milošević with responsibility for
deportations in 64 different locations. Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope and Scale
of the Milošević Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis before the ICTY, 7 NW J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 239, 247 (2009).
143. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 139, at 13, 60–61.
144. Id. at 60–62.
145. See, e.g., id. at 55; Higgins, supra note 142; Gwynn MacCarrick, Lessons from the
Milošević Trial, ON LINE OPINION (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view
.asp?article=4394 [https://perma.cc/R7S8-KD44]; Gideon Boas, Slow Poison: Joinder and the
Death of Milošević, in THE MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY 106, 113–18 (Timothy William
Waters ed., 2013).
146. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 139, at 55–56.
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be the primary objective of a prosecutor in cases like these.”147
Indeed, the comprehensive Milošević indictment was so widely condemned that
it ushered in lasting changes in prosecutorial charging practices, both at the ICTY
and later at the ICC.148 At the ICTY, judges responded to the Milošević case by
revising their procedural rules to provide Trial Chambers with broad powers to limit
the scope of trials.149 Revised Rule 73bis, in particular, authorized Trial Chambers to
fix the number of crime sites or incidents for which the Prosecution could present
evidence.150 In addition, it permitted Trial Chambers to call upon the prosecution to
reduce the number of counts charged in an indictment.151 Prosecutors strenuously
resisted these measures, largely for the same reasons that commentators criticize
charge bargaining. In particular, ICTY Judge O-Gon Kwon described the concerns
in this way:
the Prosecutor, many human-rights groups, and much of the public
consider that one of the central duties of the Tribunal is to do justice to
every single victim of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Proceeding to trial
on an indictment that is less than fully comprehensive of all the crime
sites associated with a particular accused could be seen as denying justice
to the victims of atrocities carried out at the crime sites not included.
Second, the Prosecutor and many human-rights groups seem to believe
that it is one of the Tribunal's main duties to actively foster the
reconciliation of the various ethnic groups in the region, as well as to
compile a complete historical record of the war and determine the truth
of what actually happened, both of which would ostensibly require the
trial to proceed on charges that are as comprehensive as possible.152
Despite prosecutorial resistance, however, the empirical results summarized
above showed that ICTY judges employed these expanded powers frequently and
vigorously,153 and in doing so, they led prosecutors to narrow their indictments
substantially prior to trial. For instance, after Rule 73bis was revised, in ten of the
eleven cases where prosecutors reduced charges, they did so at the insistence of the
Trial Chamber.154

147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. See BOAS, supra note 136, at 112.
149. Sarah Williams, The Severance of Case 002 at the ECCC, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 815,
828 (2015).
150. ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 73bis (D) (2015) (as amended), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal
%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT03Rev50_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4BQ-H6UQ].
151. Id. at 73bis (E).
152. O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen from the
Bench, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 360, 372–73 (2007) (noting that “the most effective measure for
tackling the problem of lengthy trials would be to limit the number of charges in the indictment
themselves”).
153. See Patrick Robinson, The Interaction of Legal Systems in the Work of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 17
(2009).
154. See Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Decision Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D)
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2011); Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić, Case
No. IT-04-79-PT, Invitation Pursuant to 73bis (D) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia

2021]

REHABILITATING CHARGE BARGAINING

835

b. The Nature of the Charge Reductions and Their Normative Implications
As noted, prosecutors reduced or declined to bring provable charges in
approximately half of all ICTY cases that went to trial and in 69% of ICTY cases
that went to trial during the last half of the Tribunal’s life. But these reductions took
more than one form, and in order to understand fully the different ways in which
international prosecutors can understate criminal liability, we must explicate these
different forms and consider any implications that emerge. One difference, for
instance, is that international prosecutors can understate criminal liability either by
eliminating or declining to bring specific crime charges, or they can do so by
eliminating or declining to prosecute specific incidents included within the charges.
This distinction needs some explanation because it does not arise in the context of
domestic crimes. For instance, a domestic defendant who intentionally killed ten
people would most likely be charged with ten counts of murder, and if prosecutors
wished to charge bargain with that defendant, they would have to withdraw some of
the murder counts. The crime against humanity of murder, by contrast, is defined as
the killing of a human being in the context of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population.155 For this reason, prosecutors can charge
the defendant with one count of murder as a crime against humanity whether the
defendant killed one person or 1000 people. Thus, when international prosecutors
wish to reduce charges either as part of a charge bargain or to reduce the length and
cost of the trial, they can either eliminate charges (for instance by withdrawing
charges of rape as a crime against humanity but retaining charges of murder as a
crime against humanity), or they can eliminate incidents that comprise the charges.
For instance, prosecutors who initially charge a defendant with murder as a crime
against humanity on the basis of ten massacre sites can eliminate five of those sites
and continue to charge murder as a crime against humanity, but on the basis of a
reduced set of incidents.

May 8, 2008); Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution
Motion for Leave to Amend the Third Amended Joinder Indictment, ¶ 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 7, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, et al., Case No. IT-05-87T, Decision on Application of Rule 73bis, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July
11, 2006); Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Invitation to the Prosecutor to Make
Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 20, 2006); Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Order Pursuant to Rule
73bis (D) to Reduce the Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 21,
2007); Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Amendment
of the Indictment and Application of Rule 73bis (D) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT,
Request to the Prosecution Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D) to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment,
2–3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 9, 2007); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No.
IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Application of Rule 73bis (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Decision on the
Application of Rule 73bis (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009).
155. Rome Statute, supra note 92, at art. 7; see also INT’L CRIM. CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES,
art. 7(1)(a) (adoption and entry into force, Sept. 9, 2002) (2011), https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7H2-NVTC].
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My data set contains examples of both kinds of reductions. For example, in
Lukić,156 Delić,157 and Strugar,158 among other cases, prosecutors eliminated or
declined to charge specific crimes as a means of reducing the length and cost of the
trial. By contrast, in Đorđević,159 Šainović et al,160 and Perišić,161 among other cases,
prosecutors retained their initial charges but eliminated large numbers of crime sites
and incidents likewise as a means of reducing the trial length and cost. Overall, in
55% of the cases in which prosecutors purposely understated criminal liability, they
eliminated charged crimes,162 whereas in the remaining 45%, prosecutors eliminated
crime sites and other incidents but retained the original criminal charges.163
A second distinction can be drawn between charge reductions that alter the factual
basis of the conviction and those that do not. This distinction arises because the same
set of facts often can be charged as more than one international crime. That is, the
execution of 200 civilians in the midst of an international armed conflict can be
charged as the war crime of willful killing in violation of the Geneva Conventions,
and it also can be charged as murder as a crime against humanity, as well as
extermination as a crime against humanity. International prosecutors routinely
charge defendants with multiple crimes for the same set of facts, and when they seek
to reduce the length and cost of trial, they sometimes withdraw one or more of those
crimes but retain a crime that encompasses the same facts as the withdrawn crimes.
With these distinctions in mind, we might wish to explore whether certain kinds
of reductions are more problematic than others; however, only the briefest
consideration reveals that few certain conclusions can be drawn. For example, at first
glance, it might seem that prosecutors who withdraw ten crime sites understate
criminal liability more problematically than prosecutors who withdraw three crime
sites, but even that seemingly straightforward proposition is contestable, because the
ten withdrawn crime sites might feature fewer victims or less serious crimes than the
three withdrawn crime sites. Indeed, the Milutinović and Đorđević Trial Chambers
required prosecutors to eliminate only a few crime sites, but the withdrawals were
highly significant because one of them was at Racak,164 the site of the notorious
massacre that led NATO to launch a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.

156. See supra note 117.
157. See supra note 115.
158. See supra note 110.
159. See supra note 118.
160. See supra note 116.
161. See supra note 119.
162. Prosecutors eliminated or declined to charge crimes in Mladić, Stanišić & Župljanin,
Lukić & Lukić, Mrkšić et al., Furundzija, Krnojelac, Strugar, Hadžihasanović, Slobodan
Milošević, Šešelj, and Karadžić.
163. Prosecutors eliminated or declined to include crimes sites and incidents in Đorđević,
Šainović et al., Perišić, Gotovina, Delić, Galić, Brđanin, Dragomir Milošević, and Stanišić &
Simatović.
164. Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Leave to Amend the Third Amended Joinder Indictment, ¶¶ 45–47 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 7, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T,
Decision on Application of Rule 73bis, ¶¶ 11–13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 11, 2006).
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Similarly, we might unreflexively assume that withdrawals that alter the factual
basis of a defendant’s criminal liability are more distortive and thus more
problematic than withdrawals that eliminate charges but retain other crimes featuring
the same facts. For example, in order to eliminate the need to prove that the
underlying conflict was “international,” prosecutors in Furundzija and Krnojelac
withdrew charges of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, which apply only
during international armed conflicts. However, relying on the same factual
assertions, they maintained charges of violations of the laws and customs of war,
which also apply during non-international armed conflicts.165 Concededly, crimes
that take place during international armed conflicts are different from—and arguably
more serious than—crimes that take place in non-international armed conflicts, but
eliminating Grave Breaches charges seems a relatively minor reduction given that
the charges alleging violations of the laws and customs of war remained. Yet, other
withdrawals have generated tremendous opposition even when the factual basis for
the conviction remained the same. For instance, prosecutors who, in the course of a
charge bargain, withdrew genocide charges against Momir Nikolić and Dragan
Obrenović were roundly criticized for distorting the factual basis of the defendants’
convictions166 even though they convicted the defendants on the same facts for
crimes against humanity.
Finally, one might think that eliminating particular crimes would prove more
distortive than eliminating incidents within crimes, but that conclusion is also
contestable. For instance, when Perišić judges forced prosecutors to reduce the scope
of the trial, the prosecutors and judges disagreed on the optimal way to do so.
Prosecutors advocated eliminating crimes167 whereas the Pre-Trial Chamber required
incidents be eliminated instead.168 Additionally, in Mladić, prosecutors withdrew
crime counts that seemed to form only a small and insignificant aspect of the case,169
but when the Trial Chamber forced prosecutors to reduce their presentation of
evidence, they withdrew large numbers of crime sites that were both factually
significant and dramatically limited the scope of their case.170

165. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT, Prosecutor's Response to Defence
Motions to Dismiss Count 12 of the Indictment for Failure Adequately to Plead International
Armed Conflict and to Dismiss Counts 12, 13 and 14 for Defects in the Form of the Indictment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 6, 1998); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25-PT, Motion to Withdraw Article 2 Counts, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 27, 2000).
166. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 66, at 427–28; Henham, supra note 69, at 217; Ralph
Henham, Penal Ideology, Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice, 57 CRIME L. AND
SOC. CHANGE 77, 91–92 (2012).
167. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Prosecution’s Response to Invitation to
the Prosecutor to Make Proposals to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2006).
168. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Application of Rule 73bis
and Amendment of Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2007).
169. For instance, prosecutors removed counts of cruel treatment or inhumane acts from
the Sarajevo crime base, but retained them in Prosecution v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-I,
Decision on Amendment of Indictment, ¶ 6 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
27, 2011).
170. See Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Prosecution Submission on
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3. Understatement of Criminal Activity at the ICC
My empirical study of ICC cases reveals that ICC prosecutors have been even
more inclined than their ICTY counterparts to charge defendants in a way that
understates their criminal liability. Indeed, in every one of the seven ICC cases that
has gone to trial, prosecutors charged defendants with only a subset of their probable
criminal activity.171 This should come as no surprise particularly for the ICC’s early
cases because early ICC charging was significantly influenced by later ICTY
charging. Specifically, the Milošević debacle and the ICTY’s overall experience with
broad indictments led the ICC’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to adopt a
narrow, “focused” investigations and charging policy whereby prosecutors selected
a “limited number of incidents” for each prosecution.172 Targeting only a small
number of incidents, Moreno-Ocampo maintained, would allow the prosecution “to
carry out short investigations” and conduct “expeditious trials while aiming to
represent the entire range of criminality.”173 In adopting this narrow charging policy,
ICC prosecutors expressly disavowed the production of a comprehensive historical
record as one of the ICC’s goals.174 Instead, ICC prosecutors intended the focused
investigations and charging policy to highlight a sampling of each defendant’s
criminality that reflects the gravest incidents and the main types of victimization.175
Said differently, the ICC’s initial prosecutorial strategy intentionally sought to
understate ICC defendants’ criminal liability so that prosecutors could conduct brief,
expeditious investigations and trials. And my empirical research shows that ICC
prosecutors wholly fulfilled that intention.
For instance, ICC prosecutors charged two of the court’s earliest defendants,
Thomas Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda, only with enlisting and conscripting child

Reduction of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 73bis (D), ¶¶ 9–13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 18, 2011).
171. The cases that have gone to trial are Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo, Bemba, Gbagbo
& Blé Goudé, Ruto & Sang, Ntaganda, and Ongwen. For the prosecution’s understatement of
criminal activity in Lubanga, see supra text accompanying notes 166–67. For Katanga and
Ngudjolo, see supra notes168–69 and accompanying text. For Ntaganda, Ongwen, Bemba,
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, and Ruto and Sang, see infra note 184 and accompanying text.
172. OTP 2006 Strategic Report, supra note 104, ¶ 2(b); Off. of the Prosecutor,
Prosecutorial Strategy: 2009–2012, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶ 20 (Feb. 1, 2010), https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/66A8dcdc-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/otpProsecutorial
Strategy20092013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C83M-ACBU] [hereinafter OTP 2009–2012
Strategic Report]. See also Jacob N. Foster, A Situational Approach to Prosecutorial Strategy
at the International Criminal Court, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 439, 442 (2016).
173. OTP 2006 Strategic Report, supra note 104, ¶ 2(b); OTP 2009–2012 Strategic Report,
supra note 172, ¶ 20.
174. OTP 2009–2012 Strategic Report, supra note 172, ¶ 20; Levi et al., supra note 104,
at 313.
175. OTP 2009–2012 Strategic Report, supra note 172, ¶ 20. See also Higgins, supra note
142, at 259; Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 323, 357 (2009); Levi et al., supra note 104, at 312;
Marlise Simons, The Milošević Lessons: Faster and More Efficient Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/europe/the-milosevic-lessons-fasterand-more-efficient-trials.html [https://perma.cc/25F6-67VJ].
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soldiers,176 despite considerable evidence that each had committed many other
serious crimes, including crimes of sexual violence.177 Similarly, for the ICC’s
second trial, prosecutors charged the defendants, Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo, with crimes confined to one attack during one day in one village,178
although both defendants likewise were implicated in far broader criminality.179
Indeed, we know that ICC prosecutors could have charged Katanga with many more
crimes because, just when he was set to be released from prison after serving his ICC
sentence, domestic Congolese prosecutors charged him with numerous additional
crimes that occurred well before his ICC prosecution.180 Similarly, prosecutors

176. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document Containing Charges
(Aug. 28, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug.
22, 2006).
177. For Lubanga, see DR Congo: ICC Charges Raise Concern, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
31, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/31/dr-congo-icc-charges-raise-concern#
[https://perma.cc/5J8U-BAYV]; deGuzman, supra note 96, at 273, 314; Roman Graf, The
International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 945, 946 (2012);
Andowah A. Newton, Introduction to the Digest on International Criminal Court Cases
Relating to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur (Sudan), Kenya, the Central African
Republic and Mali, in DIGEST ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INVESTIGATIONS IN AFRICA
3, 11 (N.Y. City B. Ass’n ed., 2016); PHIL CLARK, DISTANT JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ON AFRICAN POLITICS 85 (2018) (noting that ICC judges
encouraged the prosecution to broaden the charges in Lubanga, but the prosecution declined).
For Ntaganda, see https://redress.org/news/ntagandas-surrender-an-opportunity-for-the-iccto-deliver-justice-to-victims-in-drc/ [https://perma.cc/R6BP-BEWM]; Fourth ICC Arrest
Warrant in the DRC Situation, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 30,
2008),
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/Fourth-ICCarrest-warrant-in-the [https://perma.cc/E79P-Z65F]; DR Congo: Suspected War Criminal
Wanted: International Court Unseals Arrest Warrant Against Bosco Ntaganda, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Apr. 29, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/dr-congo-suspected-warcriminal-wanted [https://perma.cc/HJ9C-39K8].
178. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute ¶¶ 1, 7 (Mar. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Katanga Judgment].
179. Indeed, at the time ICC prosecutors charged Katanga with crimes during the one-day
attack, he had already been charged with a broader set of crimes in Congolese domestic courts,
see DR Congo: ICC Convict Faces Domestic Charges, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/dr-congo-icc-convict-faces-domestic-charges [https:/
/perma.cc/NL8S-H8WZ]; Pascal Kambale, The ICC and Lubanga: Missed Opportunities,
AFR. FUTURES, March 16, 2012, https://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/03/16/africanfutures-icc-missed-opportunities/ [https://perma.cc/H97A-VP5K], and there was evidence
that he helped lead one of the largest massacres in the region, one in which approximately
1200 civilians were killed. DR Congo: Army Should Not Appoint War Criminals, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Jan. 13, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/13/dr-congo-army-should-notappoint-war-criminals [https://perma.cc/V7H4-YBY8]; Moshe Zvi Marvit & Michelle Olson,
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga (Update) & Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2008). As for Ngudjolo, although he was charged only with crimes
occurring on one day in Bogoro, even more evidence existed of his involvement in the attacks
on the Congolese cities of Mandro and Bunia. Kambale, supra, at 195.
180. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision Pursuant to Article
108(1) of the Rome Statute (Apr. 7, 2016).
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initially charged Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander Dominic Ongwen only
with crimes that took place at one IDP camp,181 despite the prosecutor’s claim that
the LRA was responsible for 850 attacks and that Ongwen was among the group’s
core members.182 Finally, charges in other early ICC cases that did not proceed to
trial were similarly narrow. In the Garda and Banda cases, for instance, prosecutors
charged the defendants only with crimes involving one attack during which twelve
African Union peacekeepers were killed.183
Eventually, ICC prosecutors began charging more broadly, but they expanded
their charges, not because their narrow charging had distorted the defendant’s
convictions or overall historical record, but because their narrow charging had not
resulted in a satisfactory number of convictions. Specifically, ICC Pretrial Chambers
had declined to confirm charges in a series of early cases, finding that prosecutors
had not presented sufficient evidence of the defendants’ criminality.184 Trial
Chambers acquitted another early defendant after trial,185 and even when they
convicted two others, they criticized the prosecution for its evidentiary
insufficiencies.186 Those disappointing results led commentators to call into question

181. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen
(July 8, 2005).
182. Mariana Pena, Ugandan Victims Raise Concerns in Relation to the Ongwen Case,
INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/02/ugandan-victimsraise-concerns-in-relation-to-the-ongwen-case/ [https://perma.cc/9BKL-UQ26]; Matthew
Brubacher, The ICC Investigation of the Lord’s Resistance Army: An Insider’s View, in THE
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY 262, 270 (Tim Allen & Koen Vlassenroot
eds., 2010).
183. Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Public Redacted Version of
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 21–24 (Feb. 8, 2010); Prosecutor v. Banda
Abakaer Nourain & Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Public Redacted
Version of Document Containing the Charges Submitted Pursuant to Article 61(3) of the
Statute Filed on 19 October 2010, ¶ 162 (Nov. 11, 2010).
184. Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, ¶ 233 (Feb. 8, 2010); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10,
Public Redacted Version of Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 340 (Dec. 16, 2011);
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Version of Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 293–300
(Jan. 23, 2012) (declining to confirm charges against Henry Kosgey); Prosecutor v. Muthaura
et al., Case No. ICC-01/02-01/11, Public Redacted Version of Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statue, ¶ 427 (Jan. 23, 2012).
Unfortunately, due to insufficient evidence, I was unable to ascertain whether these defendants
could have been charged with additional crimes.
185. Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute, § XI. Disposition (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment].
186. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Deconstructing the Epistemic Challenges to Mass
Atrocity Prosecutions, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223, 248–49 (2018) (describing evidentiary
difficulties in the Lubanga case); Jennifer Easterday, Germain Katanga Found Guilty by the
ICC, INT’L JUST. MONITOR, (March 7, 2014), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/03/germainkatanga-found-guilty-by-the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/TQG8-726U] (discussing evidentiary
difficulties in the Katanga case); Clair Duffy, Fundamental Fair Trial Questions Remain
Unanswered Ahead of Tomorrow’s Judgment in the Katanga Case, INT’L JUST. MONITOR,
(March 6, 2014), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/03/fundamental-fair-trial-questions-
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the prosecutor’s narrow charging practices.187 Alex Whiting, for instance, observed
that:
if cases are too narrow it can be difficult to prove the criminal
responsibility of the accused, particularly if that person is higher-up in
the chain of command. A broad range of criminality over time often
compels the inference that the crimes were organized from the top. On
the other hand, if the Office presents only a narrow set of crimes on the
ground, it can be easier for the accused to blame them on the rogue
actions of lower-level actors.188
For these and other reasons, ICC prosecutors eventually replaced their focused
investigations policy with commitment to pursue “in-depth, open-ended
investigations while maintaining focus.”189 Prosecutors likewise broadened their
charging practices.190 As noted above, in 2005, prosecutors brought only seven
charges against LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen, and those charges covered only
crimes that took place at the Lukodi IDP camp.191 By the time the ICC finally gained
custody over Ongwen in 2015, however, prosecutors were inclined to charge more
broadly, so they added charges covering crimes taking place at three additional IDP
camps.192 Prosecutors likewise added charges against Ntaganda, who was initially
charged only with the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers, but eventually
also faced charges of rape, murder, and persecution.193

remain-unanswered-ahead-of-tomorrows-judgment-in-the-katanga-case/ [https://perma.cc
/NU5J-4NG5].
187. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 104, at 443 (“Scholars now argue that the OTP should . .
. abandon the focused investigations and prosecutions strategies because they depend on
unrealistic levels of state cooperation and fail to garner sufficient evidence to tie senior leaders
to crimes committed on the ground.”); see also Marieke Wierda & Anthony Triolo, Resources,
in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 113, 143–44 (Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert
eds., 2012).
188. Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Announces Important Changes in New Strategic Plan,
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 24, 2013).
189. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012–2015, ¶ 4 (Oct. 13, 2013) (on
file with the author).
190. See, e.g., Dov Jacobs, Some Thoughts on the ICC’s Strategic Plan: Trying to Build
the Future on the Failures of the Past, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.justsecurity
.org/2960/thoughts-icc-otp-strategic-plan-build-future-failures/
[https://perma.cc/PP4W3TFA] (noting that under the new policy “the focus would be broader in terms of crimes being
considered, rather than the previous supposedly narrower approach”).
191. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04, Warrant of Arrest, (July 8, 2005).
192. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Public Redacted Version of
“Notice of Intended Charges Against Dominic Ongwen,” 18 September 2015, ICC-02/0401/15-305-Conf.” (Sept. 24, 2015); Sharon Nakandha, A Move in the Right Direction: What
the Prosecutor’s Decision to Expand Ongwen’s Charges Means for Ugandan Victims and
Civil Society, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/10/amove-in-the-right-direction-what-the-prosecutors-decision-to-expand-ongwens-chargesmeans-for-ugandan-victims-and-civil-society/ [https://perma.cc/3TLS-GFH5].
193. Q&A: Bosco Ntaganda, DR Congo, and the ICC, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/02/qa-bosco-ntaganda-dr-congo-and-icc# [https://perma
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Even these broader charges that prosecutors have more recently brought have not
encompassed the full range of the defendants’ criminal activity. Certainly, ICC
prosecutors charged defendants Ntaganda, Ongwen, Gbagbo, and Bemba with a
wider range of criminality than Lubanga, Katanga, and Ngudjolo faced, but in each
of the former cases, substantial evidence suggested that the prosecution’s charges
understated the defendants’ criminal liability.194 Finally, the Prosecutor’s policy shift

.cc/N3EG-Y7VK]. In Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, prosecutors also charged defendants more
broadly with crimes taking place during five incidents: (1) a December 16, 2010 pro-Ouattara
march; (2) a late February 2011 attack in the Yopougon commune of Abidjan; (3) a March 3,
2011 pro-Ouattara women’s demonstration in the Abobo commune in Abidjan; (4) a March
17, 2011 mortar shelling of a market in Abobo; and (5) an April 12, 2011 attack in Yopougon.
194. Bemba was implicated in numerous crimes in the DRC. Covered in Blood: Ethnically
Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, HUM. RTS. WATCH at 28–30 (July 7, 2003) https://www
.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc [https:/
/perma.cc/MVT7-5GJW]; ICC: Q&A on the Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
at § 5 (Nov. 22, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/22/icc-qa-trial-jean-pierrebemba#_Toc278190576 [https://perma.cc/54ZM-5W5V]. But prosecutors charged him only
for crimes in Central African Republic. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 2 (Mar. 21, 2016). Ntaganda was charged
only with crimes occurring between July 2002 and December 2003, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda,
Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, ¶ 33 (July 8, 2019) [hereinafter Ntaganda Judgment],
despite his apparent involvement in scores of crimes thereafter. See PHIL CLARK, DISTANT
JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ON AFRICAN POLITICS 134–35
(2018); DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC Trial, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/13/dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda-icc-trial [https://
perma.cc/BD35-ZTRM]; Killings in Kiwanja, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 11, 2008),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/11/killings-kiwanja/uns-inability-protect-civilians [https
://perma.cc/LUW9-MS66]; Stefano Valentino, John Vandaele & Anneke Verbraeken, The
Killer King of North Kivu, MONDIAAL NIEUWS (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.mo.be/en/article
/killer-king-north-kivu [https://perma.cc/N92R-C7QM]. Victims praised the expansion of
charges in Ongwen, but compellingly asserted that prosecutors had inappropriately limited the
time frame of the crimes, Sharon Nakandha, Day Three of Ongwen Confirmation of Charges
Hearing, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/01/day-threeof-ongwen-confirmation-of-charges-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/P5HL-UY8M] (“The OPCV
reported to the court that its clients do not understand why the prosecution’s case is limited to
atrocities committed between July 2002 and December 2005.”), and had inappropriately
excluded Ongwen’s crimes in a variety of geographical regions. Sharon Nakandha, A Move in
the Right Direction: What the Prosecutor’s Decision to Expand Ongwen’s Charges Means for
Ugandan Victims and Civil Society, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/10/a-move-in-the-right-direction-what-the-prosecutorsdecision-to-expand-ongwens-charges-means-for-ugandan-victims-and-civil-society/ [https:/
/perma.cc/ZK44-GYGY]. Similarly, Gbagbo prosecutors charged crimes during a narrow
five-month period without considering the “grave crimes committed during the decade prior
to the most recent violence” thereby “ignor[ing] the desires of most leaders of Ivorian civil
society, who stress the importance of investigations going back to 2002, given the gravity,
scale, and complete impunity for these crimes.” THEY KILLED THEM LIKE IT WAS NOTHING: THE
NEED FOR JUSTICE IN COTE D’IVOIRE’S POST-ELECTION CRIMES, HUM. RTS. WATCH 116–17
(2011). Prosecutorial charging in Ruto et al. was more expansive than in many ICC cases, but
victims claimed that prosecutors should have charged additional crimes. See Tom Maliti,
Victims May Seek More Charges Against Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR
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toward broader charging apparently failed to produce the desired results because in
its most recent draft Strategic Plan, the Office of the Prosecutor appeared to shift
back to narrow indictments, but this time targeting lower-level offenders.
Specifically, in response to its failure to present sufficient evidence to sustain
convictions against several senior defendants, the Prosecutor has decided to pursue
“narrower cases” and to target those lower in the chain of command. In addition,
although the Prosecutor will continue to conduct open-ended and in-depth
investigations, it plans to opt for “narrower but stronger cases over broader cases.”195
Finally, the modern-day preference for narrower cases has extended to other,
more recently established institutions. In its first report to the United Nations General
Assembly, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes
under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011
(IIIM) stated:
[i]n developing its case-building policy . . . and, ultimately, constructing
its case files, the Mechanism will seek to ensure that the scope of the
associated cases will be manageable, in terms of both cost and time. Past
experience has shown that building cases that cover too many
allegations, or that focus on unnecessarily evidence-heavy categories of
crime or modes of liability, does not serve the interests of justice if they
take too long or consume too many resources.196
4. Charge Bargaining vs. Narrow Indictments: A Distinction without a Difference
The foregoing sections described the ICTY’s and ICC’s move toward narrowing
indictments, a move that should call into question our discomfort with charge
bargaining. Parts III and IV will delve more deeply into the normative questions that
my empirical study generates, but before doing so, this subsection will provide a
brief case study that shows all the more clearly the similarity—indeed near
indistinguishability—between cases that are charge-bargained and cases where
prosecutors bring artificially narrow charges without seeking to motivate the
defendant to admit guilt. Specifically, this subsection features a comparison between
the ICTY’s Deronjić case, where prosecutors brought narrow charges as part charge
bargain, with the ICC’s Katanga case, where prosecutors brought narrow charges
simply so as to conduct a shorter, less costly trial. This comparison shows that the
only notable difference between the two cases is the considerable time and resource
savings generated by the charge bargain.
Both Miroslav Deronjić and Germain Katanga were charged with crimes taking
place during one-day attacks. Deronjić was President of the Bratunac Municipal

(Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2011/08/victims-may-seek-more-charges-against
-ruto-kosgey-and-sang/ [https://perma.cc/3KFM-5LAE].
195. Off. of the Prosecutor, Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021, ICC ¶ 28, (May 14, 2019).
196. Rep. of the Int’l, Impartial & Indep. Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation &
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under Int’l Law Committed
in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/72/764 (Feb. 28, 2018).
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Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina,197 and
prosecutors charged him with persecution as a crime against humanity for the
killings, destruction of property, and forcible displacement that occurred during an
attack on the Bosnian town of Glogova on May 9, 1992.198 Katanga was a senior
leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri, DRC,199 and prosecutors charged
him with war crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred during an attack on
the Congolese town of Bogoro on February 24, 2003. Both men were convicted200
and received similar sentences: ten years for Deronjić201 and twelve years for
Katanga.202
As the foregoing suggests, the Deronjić and Katanga cases are similar in many
respects, but the treatment they received by commentators, and even judges, differed
dramatically for this reason: Deronjić was charged with only a subset of his crimes
as a result of charge bargain. Deronjić had been cooperating with prosecutors for five
years before he was indicted; in consideration for that cooperation and for Deronjić’s
promise to plead guilty and waive his right to trial, prosecutors charged Deronjić
only with the one-day attack on Glogova. However, because prosecutors brought
narrow charges against Deronjić as part of a plea deal, they were sharply criticized.
As noted above, ICTY Trial Chambers had criticized the factual distortions wrought
by charge bargaining in other cases,203 and in Deronjić, the Trial Chamber’s
presiding judge took particular aim at the prosecutor’s selective charging.
Specifically, the information Deronjić had provided convinced Presiding Judge
Schomburg that prosecutors also could have charged Deronjić with crimes relating
both to the Srebrenica massacres as well as the large-scale ethnic cleansing that
occurred in the Bratunac municipality as a whole.204 Consequently, Judge
Schomburg dissented from the ten-year sentence and lambasted charge bargaining
for its proclivity to distort the truth. Maintaining that “there is no justice without
truth, meaning the entire truth and nothing but the truth,”205 Judge Schomburg
announced that “[w]hen it comes to prosecuting crimes against individuals, a
Prosecutor acts with the goal to stop a never-ending circle of ‘private justice,’
meaning mutual violence and vengeance. This goal can only be achieved if the entire

197. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Deronjić Judgment].
198. Id. ¶ 18.
199. Katanga Judgment, supra note 178, ¶ 521.
200. However, Katanga was acquitted of rape, sexual slavery, and the use of child soldiers.
Id. § XII Disposition.
201. Deronjić Judgment, supra note 197, ¶¶ 277, 280.
202. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to
Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 147 (May 23, 2014).
203. Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 65 (Dec. 2,
2003).
204. See Deronjić Schomburg Dissent, supra note 83, ¶ 9. Institute for War and Peace
Reporting (IWPR) also reported that “[e]vidence obtained by the tribunal and seen by IWPR
corroborates that on the day that the [Srebrenica] enclave fell, [Deronjić] was named civilian
commissioner of Srebrenica—a function that would put him de jure in charge of the enclave’s
executed inhabitants.” Ana Uzelac, Judge Angered at Deronjić Prison Term, INST. FOR WAR
& PEACE REPORTING November 9, 2005.
205. Deronjić Schomburg Dissent, supra note 83, ¶ 9.
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picture of a crime is presented to the judges.”206 Judge Schomburg decried the
prosecution’s selective charging, criticizing it for “arbitrarily present[ing] facts,
selected from the context of a larger criminal plan and, for unknown reasons, limited
to one day and to the village of Glogova only.”207 Other commentators were similarly
critical of the Deronjić charge bargain.208
The Katanga prosecutors, by contrast, were subjected to no such criticism for their
decision to charge Katanga only with crimes occurring during the one-day attack on
Bogoro, even though considerable evidence existed that Katanga was involved in
other comparable or even more serious crimes.209 No one suggested that prosecutors
had inappropriately distorted the historical record by charging only a subset of
Katanga’s crimes. Indeed, if anything, the Katanga prosecutors were praised for
charging Katanga with a broader range of crimes than the Lubanga prosecutors had
brought.210
The contrast in the treatment of the two cases is particularly perverse, given that
Deronjić waived his right to trial and thereby freed up resources for other
prosecutions, whereas Katanga had a trial that lasted two years and three months211
and that featured 54 witnesses,212 643 exhibits,213 409 written decisions and orders,
and 168 oral decisions.214 Perhaps even more importantly, Deronjić not only
provided prosecutors a trove of valuable information,215 but he testified in a record
four cases216 and spent weeks on the ICTY stand providing prosecutors incriminating

206. Id. ¶ 7.
207. Id. ¶ 4.
208. See Burens, supra note 61, at 329; Drumbl, supra note 70, at 594–95; Shahram Dana,
Genocide, Reconciliation and Sentencing in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, in THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 259 (Ralph J.
Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007); Petrig, supra note 66, at 20–21; Rauxloh, supra note 66,
at 5–6.
209. See supra note 169.
210. Congo-Kinshasa; Activists Want Conflict's Power-Brokers Probed at International
Court, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Oct. 20, 2007.
211. Katanga Judgment, supra note 178, ¶ 20.
212. Id. ¶ 21.
213. Id. ¶ 22.
214. Id. ¶ 24.
215. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Transcript, 236–7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 28, 2004).
216. Deronjić testified in the Krstić appeal, see Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33A, Transcript, 101–71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 21, 2003); in the
Milošević trial, see Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 26–27, 2003); in the Blagojević case, see Prosecutor v.
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Transcript, 6305–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 21, 2004); and in Krajišnik, see Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT00-39-T, Transcript (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 2004).
Deronjić almost certainly would have testified in the Karadžić case had Deronjić not died prior
to Karadžić’s apprehension. Deronjić’s evidence included the dramatic claim that two days
before Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serb army, Karadžić said that everyone captured in the
town should be killed. Michael Farquhar, Courtside: Deronjić, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (Dec. 5, 2005), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/deronjic [https://perma.cc/6LYN5F44].
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testimony.217 During the Milošević trial, Deronjić provided crucial information about
Milošević’s involvement in Serbia’s arming of the Bosnian Serbs.218 In Krajišnik,
Deronjić painstakingly detailed the way in which the policies promulgated by highlevel Bosnian Serb politicians were implemented at the local level and led eventually
to the expulsion and murder of thousands of Muslim civilians.219 By contrast,
Katanga, having been given no incentive to provide information, testified against no
one; in fact, the ICC acquitted Katanga’s co-defendant Matthieu Ngudjolo because
prosecutors were unable to present sufficient evidence of his involvement in the
crimes at Bogoro.220
5. Summary
This Part has shown both empirically and through a case study that international
criminal prosecutors have increasingly come to favor narrow indictments that charge
defendants with only a subset of their criminal activity. The following Part will
explore the normative implications of these narrow charging policies; suffice it to
say here that this Part has highlighted the functional similarity between defendants
whose convictions are factually distorted through charge bargaining and defendants
whose convictions are factually distorted through prosecutorial charging policies that
favor narrow indictments. Despite these similarities, narrow convictions resulting
from charge bargains have been harshly criticized, whereas narrow convictions
resulting from prosecutorial charging policies are either viewed as a necessary
feature of international criminal justice or praised for their efficiency.
III. CHANGING THE CONVERSATION: FROM DISTORTION TO THE APPROPRIATE
SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CHARGING DECISIONS
Part II showed that factual distortion and understatement of criminal liability is a
common and accepted feature of international criminal convictions following trials.
Consequently, the fact that charge bargaining leads to factual distortion and
understatement of criminal liability cannot be a reason to reject charge bargaining
when it comes to international criminal trials because a substantial proportion of
international criminal convictions will feature these same disadvantages with or
without charge bargaining. At the same time, just because one criticism of a practice
is not applicable in a particular realm does not mean that the practice should be

217. COALITION FOR INT’L JUST., Srebrenica Exposed: A Word About Plea Agreements,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 25, 2003), https://iwpr.net/globalvoices/Srebrenica-exposed-word-about-plea-agreements [https://perma.cc/WN4T-BW4K];
Ana Uzelac, New Twist in Deronjić Trial, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 25, 2003),
(“Since pleading guilty, Deronjić slowly became one of the most significant witnesses for the
prosecution in many high-profile trials.”).
218. See also Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Transcript (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 12–13, 2004). See generally Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case
No. IT-02-54, Transcript (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 26–27, 2003).
219. See generally Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Transcript (Feb. 12–13,
2004).
220. Ngudjolo Judgment, supra note 185, ¶¶ 490–503, 516s.
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pursued in that realm. Specifically, I recognize that all forms of plea bargaining have
been criticized. And, if this criticism is valid such that negotiating criminal
dispositions is always to be avoided, then charge bargaining (as one form of
negotiation) should likewise be avoided even if the particular criticisms most
commonly leveled at charge bargaining per se are inapplicable. Said differently,
factual distortion and understatement of criminal liability are not reasons to reject
charge bargaining, but other good reasons to reject the practice could exist. One such
reason, for instance, would be our rejection of all forms of negotiated settlements.
This Part maintains that charge bargaining is in fact appropriate in some
circumstances. Section A rejects arguments for a categorical ban on negotiated
settlements, while Section B contends that our normative assessment of charge
bargaining should turn not on the criticisms traditionally leveled at the practice, but
on our views of appropriate international criminal charging practices in a world of
resource constraints. Section B’s analysis suggests that because narrow charging is
unquestionably appropriate in some circumstances, charge bargaining that results in
narrow charges is not only also appropriate in those circumstances, but also has the
potential to provide important benefits to international criminal justice.
A. Accepting the Desirability of Some Negotiated Dispositions
Although some commentators criticize all forms of negotiated justice,221 others,
including myself, have embraced certain forms of negotiated justice for international
criminal trials.222 So as not to repeat my own arguments or those of others that I have
rejected,223 I will simply refer the reader to my previous scholarship where I
maintained that guilty pleas, if correctly obtained, have the potential both to increase
the number of international prosecutions that can be brought and to provide muchneeded information both for victims in need of healing and for prosecutors in need
of incriminating testimony against senior offenders.224 Here, I make two additional
arguments against categorical opposition to negotiated justice for international
crimes.
First, the creators of all of the international criminal tribunals, including the ICC,
considered negotiated justice desirable at least in some circumstances, as evidenced
by the fact that all of them included provisions empowering the litigants to negotiate

221. See supra notes 45–47, 65–70.
222. See COMBS, supra note 7 (constructing a restorative justice approach to guilty pleas
and negotiated settlements so as to increase efficiency while obtaining some of the benefits
traditionally associated with truth commissions and other non-prosecutorial post-conflict
justice mechanisms); Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose,
Effects and Propriety, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 666, 671–74 (2005) (identifying valuable
information that is apt to be revealed only through negotiated settlements); Fabricio Guariglia
& Gudrun Hochmayr, Proceedings on an Admission of Guilt, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1219, 1221–23 (Otto Triffterer ed. 2d ed.,
2008) (describing favorable arguments).
223. See Tieger et al., supra note 222, at 667 (noting that few developments in international
criminal law “have been as vigorously debated or as closely examined in recent literature as
the use of plea agreements.”).
224. COMBS, supra note 7, at 5–10.
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criminal dispositions. The very first versions of the procedural rules of the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL provided for guilty pleas.225 Moreover, when the ICTY’s first case
involving a guilty plea showed that the initial rules had not provided the parties
sufficient guidance,226 the judges immediately strengthened the system, first by
adopting a rule setting forth the standards that guilty pleas had to meet,227 and later
by adopting a rule that specifically authorized the prosecution to withdraw charges
or recommend a reduced sentence following a guilty plea.228 As for the ICC, the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft statute was the basis for the Rome
Statute, and it also provided for guilty pleas from the very outset.229 The ILC’s guilty
plea provision was revised during the Preparatory Committee meetings to
incorporate more civil law elements,230 but it was always expected that the Rome
Statute would permit admissions of guilt and that those admissions would either
reduce the length of the trial or eliminate it entirely. That the creators of all of the
modern international criminal tribunals believed negotiated settlements to be a
potentially desirable option does not necessarily make them a desirable option, but it
might suggest that categorical rejection of negotiated settlements is an overreaction.
Second, even if we believe as an abstract matter that negotiated settlements
generally should be avoided, the challenges confronting international criminal justice
at this moment in its history suggest that we should consider reluctantly welcoming
them. As anyone who has followed recent developments in international criminal
justice knows, the field is now routinely said to be “in crisis.”231 Commentators
observe, for instance, that international crimes abound in locations such as Syria and

225. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 62(iii) http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_proced
ure_evidence/IT032_original_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY7Y-KNXV]; ICTR R. P. & EVID.
62(iii); http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/950629-rpe-en.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/U7KA-65F9]; SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. P. & EVID. 62 (adopted March 7,
2003), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/RPE-030703.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QNU-8Q2Y].
226. The ICTY’s first set of procedural rules did not set forth any standards that guilty
pleas had to meet, so it was initially up to the Appeals Chamber to articulate them. Prosecutor
v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
227. Specifically, ICTY judges added to the Tribunal’s procedural rules a provision
requiring guilty pleas to be voluntary, unequivocal, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62bis (as revised October 20 and November 12, 1997).
228. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 62ter (Aug. 5, 2002).
229. Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May–22 July
1994, Chapter II.B.I., Official Recs. Of the Gen. Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement
No. 10, A/49/10, art. 38(1)(d) (1994).
230. Guariglia et al., supra note 222, at 1220–21; Hans-Jörg Behrens, The Trial
Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 238, 241 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
231. See, e.g., Joseph Powderly, International Criminal Justice in an Age of Perpetual
Crisis, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2019); Sergey Vasiliev, The Crises and Critiques of
International Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (KJ
Heller et al. eds., forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3358240
[https://perma.cc/EN9J-ZQMY]; Mark Ellis, The Growing Crisis with the International
Criminal Court, JURIST (May 26, 2019), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/05/markellis-crisis-with-icc/ [https://perma.cc/C8XS-DRQS].
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Yemen, yet there is no legal jurisdiction or political willingness to bring the
perpetrators of those international crimes to justice.232 Moreover, the heady
expectations that greeted the creation of the first permanent international criminal
court nearly two decades ago have long since given way to a grim realism about the
court’s limited capabilities. Specifically, the ICC’s prosecution has amassed so
dismal a record that its supporters—no less than its critics—now question its ability
to function effectively.233 During the court’s eighteen-year existence, for instance,
ICC prosecutors have managed to convict only four defendants of international
crimes, one of whom pled guilty.234 By contrast, during those same eighteen years,
ICC prosecutors have failed to obtain custody over twelve defendants.235 They have
failed to convince the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm charges against four

232. See, e.g., ICC Urged to Investigate Syria’s Forced Deportations, AL JAZEERA (Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/icc-urged-investigate-syria-forceddeportations-190307150239434.html [https://perma.cc/JXH4-W85E]; Iranian NGO Urges
ICC to Probe Saudi-Led Coalition War Crimes in Yemen, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Jul. 2, 2019),
https://en.farsnews.ir/newstext.aspx?nn=13980411000823 [https://perma.cc/H5P8-MK52].
233. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I- This Is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in
Trouble, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L.: EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ithis-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/84R5-B6EU];
Mark Kersten, Why the ICC Should Have Opened an Investigation into Afghanistan. And How
It Could ‘Win’ a Confrontation with Washington, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Apr. 12, 2019), https://
justiceinconflict.org/2019/04/12/why-the-icc-should-have-opened-an-investigation-intoafghanistan-and-how-it-could-win-a-confrontation-with-washington/ [https://perma.cc/ZH4K
-AMYS]; Kerstin Carlson, Gbagbo’s Acquittal Suggests Confusion and Dysfunction at the
ICC, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 23, 2019, 9:34 AM), http://theconversation.com/gbagbosacquittal-suggests-confusion-and-dysfunction-at-the-icc-110200
[https://perma.cc/4SU62WMJ]; Patryk Labuda, The ICC’s ‘Evidence Problem:’ The Future of International Criminal
Investigations After the Gbagbo Acquittal, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2019), https://voel
kerrechtsblog.org/the-iccs-evidence-problem/ [https://perma.cc/L538-BVYN].
234. Those four were Thomas Lubanga, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga
Judgment]; Katanga Judgment, supra note 178; Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 41, ¶ 106; and
Ntaganda Judgment, supra note 194. Ntaganda has appealed his conviction, Prosecutor v.
Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06 A, Mr. Ntaganda’s Notice of Appeal Against the
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Sept. 9, 2019), so an acquittal on appeal
remains possible.
235. These twelve are Omar Al Bashir, Abdallah Banda, Joseph Kony, Saif Gaddafi,
Simone Gbagbo, Ahmed Haroun, Abdel Hussein, Tohami Khaled, Ali Kushayb, Sylvestre
Mudacumura, Vincent Otti, and Mahmoud Al-Werfalli.
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defendants.236 They were forced to withdraw charges against two defendants,237 and
they saw six defendants acquitted after trial or appeal.238 Mark Ellis contrasted early
international criminal justice, as carried out in the ICTY, with today’s international
criminal justice, taking place at the ICC, by stating: “History will judge the ICTY as
a success in bringing to account those who committed some of the most heinous
crimes during the war in the former Yugoslavia. However, the ICTY’s permanent
successor tribunal— the International Criminal Court … is struggling to sustain any
perceptible notion of success.”239
The ICC’s woefully disappointing record suggests that even those who, in more
favorable circumstances, would oppose negotiated settlements of international
criminal cases should be willing to entertain them at this point in the court’s history.
Certainly, the court’s current grave challenges have forced ICC prosecutors to
change course and even abandon some otherwise reasonable policies. For instance,
at the micro case level, when witness intimidation caused witnesses to recant their
testimony, prosecutors have been compelled to withdraw charges.240 Similarly, when
obstruction by states and other parties have rendered investigations unsafe and

236. ICC Pre-Trial Chambers refused to confirm charges against Bahar Abu Garda,
Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Public Redacted Version of Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 234–36 (Feb. 8, 2010), Mohammed Ali, Prosecutor v. Ali,
Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 425–30 (Jan. 23, 2012), Callixte Mbarushimana,
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶¶ 339–40 (Dec. 16, 2011), and Henry Kosgey, Prosecutor v. Kosgey et al., Case No.
ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(1) and
(b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 293, 299 (Jan. 23, 2012).
237. The two defendants are Uhuru Kenyatta, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ¶¶ 1–2
(Dec. 5, 2014), and Francis Muthaura, Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11,
Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, ¶¶
10–12 (Mar. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Muthaura Withdrawal of Charges].
238. The six are Mathieu Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 516 (Dec. 18, 2012), Jean-Pierre Bemba,
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08A, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. JeanPierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute,” ¶¶ 196–200 (June 8, 2018), William Ruto and Joshua Sang, Prosecutor v. Ruto &
Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version of Decision on Defence
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 464 (Apr. 5, 2016), Laurent Gbagbo and Charles
Blé Goudé, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, Reasons
for the Oral Decision of 15 January 2019, ¶ 28 (July 16, 2019).
239. Mark Ellis, The Latest Crisis of the ICC: The Acquittal of Laurent Gbagbo, OPINIO
JURIS (Mar. 28. 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/28/the-latest-crisis-of-the-icc-theacquittal-of-laurent-gbagbo/ [https://perma.cc/Q8US-6PJ9].
240. See Muthaura Withdrawal of Charges, supra note 237, ¶ 11 (noting that several
potential witnesses had been killed and others were unwilling to cooperate); Press Release,
Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on
the Status of the Gov’t of Kenya’s Cooperation with the Prosecution’s Investigations in the
Kenyatta Case (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-04-12
-2014&ln=en [https://perma.cc/UX9F-8NTV].
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unproductive, prosecutors have had to suspend those investigations.241 At the macro
policy level, early ICC Trial Chambers prohibited prosecutors from preparing
witnesses prior to trial. They reasoned that prepared witness testimony might lack
spontaneity and “could lead to a distortion of the truth” and constitute “a rehearsal
of in-court testimony.”242 But after a spate of witnesses were intimidated or otherwise
tampered with,243 some ICC Trial Chambers moderated their stances and began
authorizing witness proofing, concluding that the complexity of the ICC cases along
with the unfamiliarity of its legal system increases the “likelihood that witnesses will
give testimony that is incomplete, confused or ill-structured.”244
Finally, and most relevantly to this Article, external challenges have repeatedly
forced ICC prosecutors to revise their charging policies. Part II delineated the
evolution in the ICC prosecution’s charging practices, but what is notable for present
purposes is the Prosecutor’s most recent decision to temporarily shift focus from
senior, high-level offenders to lower-level, less culpable offenders.245 No one would
consider this policy change an optimal one, given the widespread belief that the
court’s limited resources should be deployed against senior offenders who are most
responsible for the charged crimes.246 But the Prosecutor’s repeated inability to
generate sufficient evidence to convict those senior offenders led to her pragmatic
revision of her charging policies to reflect more modest goals that stand a better
chance of being realized.
In a similar vein, few proponents of international criminal justice would
recommend negotiating to summarily conclude criminal proceedings if there existed
the time, money, and evidence necessary to bring even a reasonable number of

241. See, e.g., ICC Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes Inquiries, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30458347 [https://perma.cc/75YF-7KQA].
242. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the Practices
Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 51 (Nov. 30,
2007). See also Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo & Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on
a Number of Procedural Issues Raised by the Registry, ¶ 18 (May 14, 2009); Prosecutor v.
Bemba et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision on Witness Preparation and
Familiarisation, ¶¶ 26–30 (Sept. 15, 2015).
243. See John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Witness Preparation in the ICC: An
Opportunity for Principled Pragmatism, 13 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 601, 611–12 (2015).
244. Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Witness
Preparation, ¶ 36 (Jan. 2, 2013); see also Prosecutor v. Muthaura & Kenyatta, Case No. ICC01/09-02/11, Decision on Witness Preparation, ¶ 41 (Jan. 2, 2013); see also Tracey Gurd,
When Witnesses Change Their Stories…., INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 10, 2009),
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2009/02/when-witnesses-change-their-stories/ [https://perma.cc
/7LEV-5NQT] (reporting that some commentators maintain that witnesses who recant or
testify incoherently are a predictable outcome of the no-proofing policy).
245. Off. of the Prosecutor, Draft Strategic Plan 2019–2021, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶ 28 (May
14, 2019).
246. Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals Important Strategy Shift in New Public Policy
Document, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecutor
-signals-important-strategy-shift-in-new-policy-document/ [https://perma.cc/SW97-NRVD]
(“The aim of every international criminal tribunal that preceded the ICC, and the ICC in the
first years of its existence, was to focus on the most responsible perpetrators, those at the top
of the chain of command.”); see supra note 134.
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offenders to justice following a trial. But precisely because those resources are in
dramatically short supply, most commentators warmly welcomed the ICC’s first and
only admission of guilt in the Al Mahdi case,247 even though Al Mahdi is a low-level
offender, and even though prosecutors—perhaps as part of a charge bargain—only
charged him with a narrow set of crimes involving cultural property when he was
arguably also implicated in murder and sexual violence.248 These suboptimal aspects
of the case notwithstanding, the Al Mahdi admission of guilt was celebrated precisely
because it was made fourteen years into the court’s existence, when, during those
fourteen years, prosecutors had managed to convict only two defendants of
international crimes following trials. That is, a compelling argument can be made
that, at a point in history when international criminal justice professionals are
expending so much (in time, resources, and political capital) to achieve so little, we
need more such “successes” even if we might adopt a different definition of
“success” under more favorable circumstances. Said differently, at this point in time,
international criminal justice in general and the ICC in particular cannot afford to
categorically eschew procedural devices—even those some consider suboptimal—if
those procedural devices could pave the way for far better results than the ICC has
been able to achieve without them.
B. A Reality-Based Assessment of International Charge Bargaining
Part II showed that our normative assessment of international charge bargaining
should not relate to the factual accuracy of the criminal convictions that result from
such bargaining because convictions obtained even without charge bargaining are
also prone to factual inaccuracy. In this Section, therefore, I argue that our normative
assessment of charge bargaining should instead turn primarily on our view of the
optimal breadth of international criminal charging. In particular, if we were to
determine that international criminal prosecutors should charge their defendants as
expansively as the evidence allows, then we should oppose charge bargaining along
with any other charging policy that serves to reduce criminal liability for nonevidentiary reasons. If, by contrast, we deem it sometimes appropriate to charge a
defendant with only a subset of the crimes for which he is seemingly responsible,

247. See Alex Whiting, The Significance of the ICC’s First Guilty Plea, JUST SECURITY
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32516/significance-iccs-guilty-plea/ [https://
perma.cc/L45K-NZMP]; Marina Lostal, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi: A Positive New Direction
for the ICC?, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 26, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/10/26/prosecutor-v-almahdi-a-positive-new-direction-for-the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/EZ2V-QSNF]; Mark Kersten,
The al-Mahdi Case is a Breakthrough for the International Criminal Court, JUST. IN CONFLICT
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/25/the-al-mahdi-case-is-a-breakthrough
-for-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/DJS6-N2EQ]; Tom Maliti, ICC
Convicts Al Faqi of Single War Crime, Sentences Him to Nine Years in Prison, INT’L JUST.
MONITOR (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/09/icc-convicts-al-faqi-of-singlewar-crime-sentences-him-to-nine-years-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/E73F-F6CK].
248. Whiting, supra note 247; Marie Forestier, ICC to War Criminals: Destroying Shrines
is Worse than Rape, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 22, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/22
/icc-to-war-criminals-destroying-shrines-is-worse-than-rape-timbuktu-mali-al-mahdi/ [https:/
/perma.cc/C8KC-8ZB2].
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then we should consider charge bargaining a potentially valuable tool to achieve that
end.
In thinking about the optimal breadth of international criminal charging, we must
start with the reality established in Part II, namely, that international criminal courts
can prosecute only a small proportion of the crimes committed as part of any given
atrocity, and that necessarily means that international courts can prosecute only a
small number of offenders per conflict. But the proportion of any given defendant’s
crimes that can be prosecuted is not similarly mandated by resources constraints.
Even assuming a fixed set of (inadequate) resources, prosecutors can choose to
charge all of their defendants comprehensively, so long as they indict sufficiently
few defendants, or they indict lower-level defendants who have committed relatively
few crimes. With the same set of fixed resources, however, prosecutors can
alternatively charge a larger number of defendants or they can target more senior
defendants who have engaged in more widespread criminality, so long as they
selectively charge those defendants with only a subset of their alleged crimes. We
know indeed that these various policy options exist because, as Part II described,
international criminal prosecutors have mixed and matched between them during the
last twenty-five years. That is, at various times, ICTY prosecutors have
comprehensively charged low-level offenders,249 and they have comprehensively
charged senior offenders. 250 At other times they, and their ICC counterparts, have
selectively charged both low-level251 and senior offenders.252
Prosecutors deciding between these different options invariably consider a host
of relevant factors, some of which are highly pragmatic whereas others are more
philosophical and principled. Principled factors include the purposes of international
criminal law and the penological goals that prosecutions are expected to advance.
Unfortunately, the goals of international criminal law, as well as their order of
prioritization, are highly contested.253Indeed, commentators have observed that
international criminal prosecutions are often unrealistically expected to serve

249. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June 25, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
250. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popović et al, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008), Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept.
27, 2006); Higgins, supra note 142, at 241–49 (discussing comprehensive charging of
Milošević).
251. Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 41; Lubanga Judgment, supra note 234; Katanga
Judgment, supra note 178.
252. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04, Public Redacted Version of
Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005).
253. See Mirjan Damaška, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 329, 331–35 (2008); Stuart Ford, A Hierarchy of the Goals of
International Criminal Courts, 27 MINN. J. INT’L L. 179 (2018).
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competing, sometimes opposing, goals simultaneously.254 What is relevant for our
purposes, however, is simply that any sort of prioritizing of goals necessarily
influences the prosecution’s charging practices. For instance, those who believe that
prosecutions should contribute to the historical record of the conflict255 will be more
inclined toward indicting and comprehensively charging senior leaders than those
who view the purpose of prosecutions more modestly as adjudicating the specific
facts of a particular indictment.256 Similarly, those who consider that prosecutions
should primarily serve retributive ends257 will favor more comprehensive charging
than those who believe international prosecutions should primarily advance
expressive aims.258 Those who emphasize the deterrent value of international
criminal prosecutions259 likewise are apt to opt for narrow prosecutions. Studies
suggest that deterrence is better advanced by more lenient, certain penalties than by
harsher but less certain penalties.260 So, those wishing to advance deterrence will
seek to prosecute a larger number of offenders even if the charges against those
defendants must be limited. Finally, one’s views on the appropriate role for victims
also influences the range and breadth of charging. As a general matter, once a
defendant has been indicted, victims favor more comprehensive charging,261 so the
more robust the voice of victims, the broader prosecutorial charging practices are apt
to be.

254. Damaška, supra note 253, at 331–35 (2008); Frédéric Mégret, The Anxieties of
International Criminal Justice, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 197, 209–11 (2016).
255. See, e.g., Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON
ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 249, 252–53
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001); Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal
Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 2, 9–10 (1998) [hereinafter Cassese, Current Trends]; Antonio Cassese, Reflections on
International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1998); Momir Nikolić Judgment,
supra note 29, ¶ 60 (“[T]hrough public proceedings, the truth about the possible commission
of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide[,] was to be determined, thereby
establishing an accurate, accessible historical record.”).
256. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963).
257. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012) (noting that the retributive approach “dominates the
international criminal regime”).
258. See deGuzman, supra note 96. Malu notes, for instance, that the ICC Prosecutor may
have adopted an expressive approach to case selection given its preference for few cases and
“short investigations.” See LINUS NNABUIKE MALU, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND PEACE PROCESSES 51 (2019).
259. See, e.g., Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal
Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 434
(2013); Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?,
70 INT’L ORG 443 (2016).
260. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ANTHONY E. BOTTOMS, ELIZABETH BURNEY & P-O.
WILKSTRÖM, CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
RESEARCH 5 (1999).
261. ICC victims are particularly likely to favor comprehensive charging because only
those who are victims of crimes for which the defendant has been convicted are eligible to
receive reparations.
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Unfortunately, there is no agreement on how to prioritize the potential goals of
international criminal justice, but even if there were, we would still need to prosecute
cases in the real world, and the real world of international criminal justice features a
host of practical challenges that prosecutors invariably must consider when deciding
which charges to bring. Examples of relevant pragmatic factors that influence
charging decisions include the security of the crime sites, the availability of evidence,
the cooperation level of the states in question, and the quantity of resources available.
As Part II detailed, the first ICTY Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, brought
indictments against low-level Yugoslav offenders already in custody precisely
because he had little ability to obtain custody over more senior offenders who
retained political or military power.262 However, at the very same time, the very same
Richard Goldstone, while acting as the ICTR Prosecutor, brought indictments against
high-level Rwandan offenders because he was able to apprehend them, thanks to the
enthusiastic assistance of Rwanda and other states.263 Richard Goldstone obviously
adapted his charging practices in light of the real-world circumstances surrounding
those practices.
Likewise, the ICC Prosecutor manifested a lengthy commitment to targeting highlevel offenders but has recently been forced to change course due to the difficulty of
obtaining custody over those high-level offenders and the equivalent difficulty of
obtaining sufficient evidence to convict the few high-level offenders who have ended
up in the dock.264 Similarly, ICC prosecutors have also invoked other pragmatic
factors to justify narrow charging. ICC prosecutors, for instance, pointed to the
instability in the DRC and concomitant difficulty of conducting comprehensive
investigations in such insecure regions to justify the narrow charges they brought in
the Lubanga and Katanga cases.265 And, prosecutors more generally point to
resource constraints and evidentiary challenges to explain their inclination to charge
narrowly.266 Indeed, although different factors combine and coalesce differently in
different cases, the general practice of the international criminal tribunals suggests
that the greater the evidentiary challenges, regional insecurity, resource constraints,
and lack of state assistance, the more likely that prosecutors will seek to focus their
investigations and prosecutions on a narrow range of criminal charges.
The previous discussion indicates that optimal targeting and charging practices
are never one-size-fits-all. Rather selecting defendants and ascertaining the
appropriate charging breadth is frequently case specific and always complicated. As

262. Frederiek de Vlaming, Selection of Defendants, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 542,
550–51 (Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2012).
263. Press Release, U.N. Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribunals, Cooperation and
Assistance of States Key to Success of ICTR (Mar. 9, 1999), https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news
/cooperation-and-assistance-states-key-success-ictr [https://perma.cc/P3YU-BG5T]; Press
Release, U.N. Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribunals, The Six Suspects Apprehended
in Kenya in July to Appear for the First Time Before an ICTR Judge on 14 August 1997 (Aug.
11, 1997), https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/six-suspects-apprehended-kenya-july-appear-firsttime-ictr-judge-14-august-1997 [https://perma.cc/C8SG-GBCM].
264. See supra text accompanying notes 193–94.
265. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Prosecutor's Information
on Further Investigation, ¶¶ 8–9 & n.20 (June 28, 2006).
266. Off. of the Prosecutor, supra note 104, ¶ 2(b).

856

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:803

a theoretical matter, we might always prefer to target the most culpable senior
offenders, but when apprehending them or proving their culpability becomes
problematic, we may need to compromise our principles and target lower-level
offenders. Charging decisions can be even more nuanced and susceptible to outside
influence. In a world of unlimited resources, we would certainly prefer offenders to
be prosecuted for all or at least most of their crimes, but once we acknowledge that
the vast majority of international crimes taking place during a conflict will not be
prosecuted, the appropriate charging breadth becomes a highly contested question,
precisely because the goals of international criminal law and their prioritization are
themselves so contested and not subject to definitive resolution. Whether, as a
philosophical matter, one prefers comprehensive indictments of a smaller number of
offenders or narrower indictments of a larger number of offenders depends largely
on one’s view of the purposes and reasonable aims of international criminal
prosecutions and the likelihood that those aims can be advanced. As noted above,
some goals point in favor of comprehensive charging whereas others point toward
more narrow charging, but not only is there no agreement as to which goals to pursue,
we have even less certainty about our ability to achieve those goals even if we
prioritize them. We might adopt narrow charging practices, for instance, in order to
increase deterrence, but achieving any sort of deterrence through international
criminal prosecutions is itself highly speculative regardless of the charging practices
we employ.267
Given the controversy surrounding international criminal law’s goals, it should
come as no surprise that international criminal prosecutors have not generally tied
their charging decisions to the advancement of any particular goal, but rather have
been driven largely by pragmatic considerations. And those pragmatic considerations
have led prosecutors to charge comprehensively in some cases and more narrowly in
others. These varying charging practices and the factors that influence them tell us
nothing about whether prosecutors have weighed considerations correctly in any
individual case. However, they do suggest that narrow charging is at least reasonable
and perhaps optimal in some circumstances and for some cases. Indeed, one could
consider this proposition self-evident. ICTY judges expressly endorsed the validity
of narrow charging when they began regularly calling on the prosecution to eliminate
counts and incident sites. Likewise, the ICC Prosecutor adopted and publicized a
narrow charging strategy for the better part of the court’s first decade.
Once we acknowledge that it is appropriate for prosecutors to charge some
international defendants with only a subset of their criminal behavior, then we should
not reflexively criticize prosecutors reaching that same result through charge
bargaining. Indeed, given that prosecutions take place in a world in which defendants
are highly unlikely to be prosecuted for all of their crimes in any event, charge
bargaining has the potential to provide a variety of benefits that heretofore have been
left on the table, as it were. These are the same benefits that attend most forms of
negotiated justice, but as I and others have developed, in the international context,
they can be particularly valuable. Specifically, resolving cases through guilty pleas
and admissions of guilt saves tremendous resources and can thereby enable

267. See, e.g., Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787–91 (2006).
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international criminal justice bodies to increase dramatically the proportion of
perpetrators they can prosecute. Moreover, if prosecutors conduct negotiations
appropriately, they can procure information that can be crucial to other prosecutions,
particularly those of accomplices or senior offenders. Prosecutors can also procure
information that is not instrumentally valuable for subsequent prosecutions but that
is highly prized by victims. Such information can include details about the crime, the
victims, and most notably, the locations of loved ones’ remains. Admissions of guilt
and guilty pleas can also feature elements of remorse, which have the potential to
enhance reconciliation and victim satisfaction. To be sure, victims also typically
value comprehensive indictments that charge defendants with all of their
criminality,268 but if comprehensiveness is impossible to achieve for other reasons,
then victims—and the international criminal justice project as a whole—stands to
gain from the thoughtful employment of charge bargaining.
Finally, Part II’s empirical analysis of international prosecutorial practice over the
last two decades shows that I and other international criminal law commentators have
had it completely backwards. We deemed charge bargaining to be more problematic
than sentence bargaining largely because we believed charge bargaining to introduce
factual distortion into international criminal convictions. The primary revelation of
this Article, however, is that a large proportion of cases that go to trial in international
criminal courts feature factual distortion, so the international criminal justice system
is already suffering the core disadvantage of charge bargaining. Thus, employing
charge bargaining has the potential to provide substantial benefits without generating
any new costs. Sentence bargaining, by contrast, introduces additional costs to obtain
the same benefits. Specifically, when prosecutors use sentence bargaining to procure
guilty pleas or admissions of guilt, they must promise to discount the sentence that
the defendant would otherwise receive for his criminal conduct. Thus, whereas
charge bargaining replicates the narrow charging that current international
prosecutors favor in any event, sentence bargaining introduces sentencing reductions
from which defendants would not otherwise benefit.
IV. CHARGING FORWARD: ADDRESSING THE PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE
EFFECTIVE USE OF CHARGE BARGAINING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Part III makes the theoretical case for using charge bargaining in international
criminal prosecutions, but I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the practical
difficulties that may impede its effective employment. Or, said differently, a number
of conditions must exist for international prosecutors to employ charge bargaining
efficiently and effectively, which this Part will canvass. Specifically, and at a
minimum, defendants must find reduced charges (and the concomitant sentence
benefits) sufficiently motivational to induce them to waive their trial rights. In

268. See, e.g., Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers: An
Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 945, 946 (2012) (“The very
narrow scope of these charges met with considerable criticism throughout the trial by
representatives of victims . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Joint Application
of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the Procedure under
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, ¶¶ 10–12 (May 22, 2009) (seeking to
recharacterize charges to include inhuman and/or cruel treatment and sexual slavery).
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addition, in some cases, prosecutors must be willing to understate substantially the
defendant’s criminal liability, prosecutors must perform relatively broad
investigations, and Trial Chambers must be willing to reward defendants for
admitting guilt. I will address each of these conditions in turn.
First, when it comes to domestic crimes in Western countries, we have good
reason to believe that defendants can be motivated to waive their trial rights through
the promise of reduced sentences.269 Reduced charges and discounted penalties
unquestionably prove motivational to many international offenders as well, but my
previous research indicates that ideological commitments and cultural beliefs can
complicate the bargaining process and impede prosecutorial efforts to procure trial
waivers.270 When defendants face negative external consequences for admitting guilt
or when they value a public trial as a means of bolstering their reputations back home,
they will be less inclined to admit guilt, or they will require reductions that the
prosecutor may be unwilling to provide. No one negotiating blueprint exists,
especially for ICC prosecutors who prosecute defendants from a wide variety of
countries, cultures, and conflicts. Suffice it to say, however, that prosecutors must be
keenly attuned to the background, beliefs, and desires of their defendants if they want
charge reductions to inspire admissions of guilt.
Next, prosecutors seeking to charge bargain may need to substantially understate
the defendant’s criminal liability. In particular, prosecutors must reduce charges in a
way that will provide defendants assurance that they will in fact receive a penalty
reduction. This is no simple task because Trial Chambers have broad discretion over
sentencing. At the ICC, for instance, Trial Chambers have the authority to sentence
defendants to a term of imprisonment from one to thirty years, or to life
imprisonment,271 and they are not subject to any mandatory guidelines or other
restrictions on their discretion. For this reason, a low-ranking defendant who
committed twelve murders is not likely to admit guilt for eleven murders in order to
obtain a lower sentence, because that defendant would have no assurance that a Trial
Chamber with virtually unlimited discretion will in fact reduce his sentence.
Providing defendants sufficient assurance of a sentence reduction may then require
prosecutors to charge defendants with considerably less criminality than the
defendants likely perpetrated. On the one hand, providing such assurance becomes
ever more difficult when prosecuting senior offenders who may have committed so
many crimes that their conviction for even a small subset could leave them vulnerable
to a lengthy sentence. At the same time, as previously detailed, ICC prosecutors
routinely and voluntarily charged defendants with only a small subset of their
criminal activity,272 and that precedent should indicate their willingness to do
likewise to obtain an admission of guilt.
Indeed, ICTY and ICTR prosecutors who engaged in charge bargaining
recognized the need for significant charge reductions; consequently, when
concluding plea agreements, they were willing to eliminate genocide charges or

269. Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas, supra note 30, at 70, 79–80 (citing sophisticated plea
bargaining models that American academics have constructed premised on the assumption
that defendants seek to minimize their incarceration time by pleading guilty).
270. Id. at 137–41.
271. Rome Statute, supra note 92, art. 77(1).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 170–95.
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substantially recast the nature and scope of the defendants’ criminal activities.273 Of
course, the more significant the charge reductions, the more prosecutors distort the
factual records of defendants’ crimes. Such distortion would be a high cost to bear if
prosecutors would otherwise charge more comprehensively. But, as discussed above,
when narrow charging is preferred for independent reasons, then prosecutors can
employ significant charge reductions as a means of gaining some benefit from the
constraints under which they are forced to operate in any event.
Another necessary condition for effective charge bargaining is effective
investigations and a willingness sometimes to prosecute more broadly than
prosecutors might otherwise desire. This Article has maintained that prosecutors who
are inclined to charge defendants with only a subset of their criminal activity can
gain much-needed benefits if they can convince defendants to admit guilt to that
subset of criminal activity. But defendants will not be willing to admit guilt to the
subset unless they fear prosecution for a much broader range of crimes. Said
differently, in order to successfully charge bargain, prosecutors must charge
defendants with all or most of their criminal behavior, with the expectation that they
will eliminate many of the charges if the defendant admits guilt. However, in order
to charge the full range of criminal behavior—and at the ICC to have those charges
confirmed—prosecutors must devote enough resources to investigations to unearth
the full range of the defendant’s criminal behavior. For example, once prosecutors
determined to bring a focused set of charges against Germain Katanga, centering on
the one-day attack in Bogoro, they had no need to investigate the other crimes
Katanga allegedly perpetrated. Had they sought to use charge bargaining to obtain
an admission of guilt for the attacks occurring in Bogoro, however, they would have
had to investigate Katanga’s other alleged crimes so as to plausibly threaten him with
their prosecution. Moreover, if a given defendant refuses to admit guilt, prosecutors
will likely have to bring the more comprehensive set of charges to trial. If, after
negotiating unsuccessfully, prosecutors were willing to reduce charges without
obtaining an admission of guilt, they would thereby send a message to subsequent
defendants that they need not admit guilt in order to obtain the advantages of
admitting guilt.
Obviously, broader investigations and charging can be costly, and in some cases
the costs will be too high. To the extent, for instance, that the prosecutor’s initial
inclination to charge narrowly in the first place stems from an unstable security
situation or an inability to gain credible evidence, then she might understandably be
unwilling to substantially broaden her investigations in the hope of obtaining an
admission of guilt, not least because the additional investigations may not procure
the desired outcome. But if deployed carefully and in appropriate contexts, then the
additional costs incurred as a result of charge bargaining will be more than offset by
the gains. Indeed, Lubanga’s trial on the narrow charges of enlisting and conscripting
child soldiers lasted approximately two and a half years274 while Katanga’s trial for
the one-day attack on Bogoro lasted two and a third years.275 Al Mahdi’s proceedings

273. See COMBS, supra note 7, at 63–71, 97–108.
274. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 234, ¶ 11.
275. Katanga Judgment, supra note 178, ¶ 20.
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on his admission of guilt, by contrast, lasted three days.276 Admissions of guilt
unquestionably save tremendous resources; thus, the costs incurred to obtain them,
if carefully considered and expended in the right circumstances, have the potential to
pay exceptional dividends.
The final condition necessary for successful charge bargaining rests with the Trial
Chamber. Specifically, Trial Chambers must sentence in ways that reward
defendants for admitting guilt. In some ICTY and ICTR cases involving guilty pleas,
Trial Chambers were not willing to sentence in accordance with prosecutorial
recommendations because they considered those recommendations unduly lenient.277
This unwillingness unquestionably impaired prosecutors’ ability to convince
subsequent defendants to plead guilty because the defendants had no confidence that
they would receive the benefits for which they had bargained.278 Indeed, it came as
no surprise that guilty pleas came to a sudden end at both the ICTY and the ICTR
when Trial Chambers began rejecting prosecutorial sentence recommendations.279
Indeed, we might have even heightened concerns about ICC Trial Chambers’
reactions to admissions of guilt because the ICC has been structured to include more
civil law elements;280 specifically, negotiated justice is less familiar to civil law
judges,281 and civil law judges are accustomed to exercising a greater control over
the trial proceedings282 and are consequently more reluctant to cede any of their
discretion to prosecutors.
Although Trial Chambers are crucial to the success of any negotiated justice
scheme, I believe they will play their parts. At the time that ICTY and ICTR Trial
Chambers spurned prosecutorial sentencing recommendations in guilty plea cases,
the tribunals were at their heights—in terms of their resources, their reputations, and
their accomplishments. For this reason, the Trial Chambers could afford to behave
in ways that undermined the prosecution’s ability to obtain guilty pleas. That is, the
tribunals were considered generally successful,283 and while it might have been nice

276. Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 41, ¶ 7.
277. COMBS, supra note 7, at 77–83.
278. Alex Whiting, Encouraging the Acceptance of Guilty Pleas at the ICC, POST
CONFLICT JUST. (Feb. 11, 2015) http://postconflictjustice.com/encouraging-the-acceptance-ofguilty-pleas-at-the-icc/ [https://perma.cc/V357-HVNY].
279. Id.
280. Jerry E. Norton, The International Criminal Court: An Informal Overview, 8 LOY. U.
CHI. INT’L L. REV. 83, 88–90 (2010); Sergey Vasiliev, Proofing the Ban on ‘Witness
Proofing’: Did the ICC Get it Right?, 20 CRIM. L. FORUM 193, 206 (2009).
281. As noted, see supra text accompanying notes 55–61, negotiated justice came much
later to civil law jurisdictions than common law jurisdictions.
282. Philippe Bruno, The Common Law from a Civil Lawyer’s Perspective, in
INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 5 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H.
Bernal eds., 1994) (“Judges are at the center of the civil law system.”); Mary C. Daly, Some
Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil and Common Law Legal Systems,
2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 65, 70 (1999) (“In the civil law system, the judges—not the
parties—drive the criminal process.”).
283. See, e.g., Erin Kathleen Lovall & June Ellen Vutrano, Seeking Truth in the Balkans:
Analysis of Whether the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Has
Contributed to Peace, Reconciliation, Justice, or Truth in the Region and the Tribunal's
Overall Enduring Legacy, 5 L.J. SOC. JUST. 252, 310 (2015) (“While there are many valid
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to expedite their proceedings, it was not essential, either to gain convictions or overall
legitimacy. The ICC, by contrast, is in an entirely different—and far less positive—
position. For that reason, it came as no surprise that the Trial Chamber sentenced in
accordance with prosecutorial recommendations in the Al Mahdi case, and we have
every reason to believe that they will continue to sentence in ways that promote
admissions of guilt when given the opportunity.
CONCLUSION
International criminal justice is surrounded by soaring rhetoric.284 Especially at
the field’s outset, scholars and commentators assumed without reflection that
international criminal prosecutions would advance a host of significant goals,
including affirming the rule of law in weak, lawless states,285 promoting peace and
assisting in the transition to democracy,286 reconciling formerly conflicting parties,287
deterring future despots from committing similar crimes,288 and creating a historical
record of the conflict that would assist in achieving all of the previously delineated
goals.289
The succeeding years have conclusively shown that international criminal justice
reality fails to match its rhetoric, and in no realm is that mismatch more divergent
than in the realm of international criminal charging. Charging international

complaints about the form, speed, and cost of that justice, most agree that the ICTY has been
generally successful in this endeavor and that its legacy of justice will be positive."); Fatou
Bensouda, Theodor Meron & Abiodun Williams, The ICC and the Yugoslav Tribunal:
Upholding International Criminal Law?, ROYAL INST. INT’L AFFS. (Apr. 2, 2014)
(International Law Programme meeting summary).
284. Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global
and Local in the Age of Accountability, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 712, 720 (2003) (book review) (“In
the judicial dawn of the ICC, much of the literature is approving, if not celebratory, in tone . .
. .”).
285. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 25 (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 56 (2000);
Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution
and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83 (1996).
286. Cassese, Current Trends, supra note 255, at 9–10.
287. See Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and
Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF
MASS ATROCITY 1, 3–4 (Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover eds., 2004) (discussing this
literature).
288. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1996); Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 12 (1990);
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991). Indeed, the Security Council established the
ICTY while the Yugoslavian conflict was still underway with the express goal of deterring
international crimes. See Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Prosecution of Perss. Responsible
for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L. Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶13, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 1994).
289. See supra note 255.
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defendants with the full range of their criminality is not only intuitively appropriate
but is almost certainly best placed to advance whatever penological goals one
prioritizes for international criminal trials. Charging international defendants with
the full range of their criminality is also utterly impossible. Prosecutors in early ICTY
cases managed that feat only because they were forced to prosecute low-level
offenders who had committed relatively few crimes. Once ICTY (and later ICC)
prosecutors gained access to more senior defendants, they were forced to confine
their charges to a sampling of the defendants’ overall criminality. At the ICTY, it
was the Trial Chambers that insisted on narrow indictments, whereas at the ICC, it
was prosecutors who voluntarily adopted narrow charging policies. But however
these charging practices came about, this Article has shown that are now entrenched
and there is little reason to expect them to change.
What is fascinating is that the same commentators who excoriated charge
bargaining have accepted—and in some cases embraced—the prosecution’s narrow
charging policies, despite the fact that narrow charging leads to the same factual
distortions that these commentators found wholly unacceptable when they resulted
from charge bargaining. Indeed, this Article has shown that the on-the-ground
charging changes that Article identifies should cast charge bargaining in a whole new
and far more positive light. Simply put, if, due to a range of practical limitations,
international criminal prosecutors are compelled in a given case to limit their charges
to a subset of the defendant’s criminal liability—and are compelled to suffer the
resulting disadvantages of that narrow charging—then those prosecutors should
consider using charge bargaining to gain much-needed advantages from the
suboptimal charging environment in which they find themselves. Indeed, never was
there a context in which we had a greater need to make lemonade from lemons.
The ICC is approaching its twentieth birthday and has achieved much less while
spending much more than anyone would like. ICC prosecutors must routinely
navigate among defiant states, intimidated witnesses, an idealistic NGO community,
a politicized Security Council, and an Association of States Parties unwilling to
provide the resources necessary for the Court to achieve what is expected of it. To
be sure, charge bargaining is no panacea for these and the other grave challenges
currently facing international criminal justice. At the same time, in this seemingly
impossible environment, charge bargaining can be seen as low-hanging fruit. This
Article has shown that current international criminal prosecutions are suffering the
primary cost of charge bargaining and realizing none of its benefits. Given that, it is
time to rehabilitate charge bargaining.
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